Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism by Reynolds, Laurie
Washington Law Review 
Volume 78 Number 1 
2-1-2003 
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New 
Regionalism 
Laurie Reynolds 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 Wash. 
L. Rev. 93 (2003). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol78/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 2003 by Washington Law Review Association
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION,
METROPOLITAN EQUITY, AND THE NEW
REGIONALISM
Laurie Reynolds*
Abstract: The economic gap between affluent suburbia and the urban core has recently
received widespread attention among state and local government law scholars. Although the
underlying normative arguments rest on very different rationales, scholars with a wide range
of doctrinal approaches appear to have formed a consensus that the current concentration of
wealth and resources in metropolitan areas is unacceptable. Their common goal of reducing
regional disparities has made the scholarly dialogue a dispute over how, rather than whether,
to achieve a better distribution. For many of what can be described as the "New Regionalist"
scholars, voluntary intergovernmental cooperative efforts may appear to offer the potential to
accomplish many of their stated goals. This Article examines the common types of
intergovernmental cooperative efforts and concludes that they fail to correct, and often
exacerbate, the socioeconomic gap. Thus, the regionalist agenda must be reworked to take
account of the negative impacts that many of the highly touted regional governance efforts
actually produce in metropolitan areas.
I. INTRODUCTION
Metropolitan America remains stubbornly resistant to attempts to
limit local government proliferation and the political fragmentation and
territorial overlapping it produces.' Frequent and repeated calls for local
government consolidation,2 regional legislatures,3 strengthened municipal
Professor of Law, University of Illinois. Many thanks to Richard Briffault, John Lopatka, and
Steve Ross for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank
Jeanah Park and Jennifer Chavez for their outstanding, indeed invaluable, research assistance.
1. In his evaluation of the repeated failures of consolidation movements, Anthony Downs ascribes
the lack of political will for metropolitan government to the following factors: local government
officials' opposition to power sharing; residents' fear of more remote, less responsive government;
and suburban fears of wealth redistribution. His negative assessment of the potential for region-wide
consolidation is categorical: "In short, almost no one favors metropolitan area government except a
few political scientists and intellectuals. Proposals to replace suburban governments completely are
therefore doomed." ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 170 (1994).
2. For a survey of the repeated rejection of metropolitan consolidation movements, see JOHN J.
HARRIGAN & RONALD K. VOGEL, POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE METROPOLIS 350-62 (6th ed. 2000);
Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1115, 1117-19 (1996); John Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan Areas: Voter
Resistance and Reform Persistence, 13 PACE L. REV. 449, 461-63 (1993). Some commentators
continue to urge consolidation as a solution to regional inequity. See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT
SUBURBS 91-95 (1993) (endorsing regionalism through strengthening urban counties, consolidating
cities and counties, or combining counties into regional governments).
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annexation powers,4 and anti-sprawl growth policies have not altered the
patterns of local government formation and growth.5 New municipalities
continue to form at ever increasing distances from central cities. And
demographic statistics confirm that as suburbanization trends proceed
unabated, central cities in major metropolitan areas suffer the loss of high
taxpaying residents who prefer to live in smaller, less urbanized, more
homogeneous communities. This increasing stratification between city
and suburb may be the intended result of state laws pertaining to local
government formation, which allow affluent, homogeneous enclaves to
form their own government and thus prevent the redistribution of
resources that occurs when wealthy and poor pay property taxes to the
same general purpose municipality. In the alternative, it may merely
reflect the nostalgic American dream of a single family home in a safe
and small community. Whatever the underlying cause, the population
trends document the overall out-migration of middle- and upper-class
residents from central city to suburb.6 As a result, in terms of job
creation,7 quality of schools,' affordable housing, and income, 9 to name a
3. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1164-71.
4. See RUSK, supra note 2, at 9-11; Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers,
24 URB. LAW. 247,258-71 (1992).
5. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2037-42 (2000). In the urban
studies literature, the calls for a reversal of the government policies that have produced sprawl are
forcefully articulated in ANDRES DUANY ET AL, SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000) and JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE (1993). Urban
economists have also made the case for anti-sprawl policies. See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 1;
Rosalind Greenstein and Wim Wiewel, Introduction to Urban-Suburban Interdependencies, in
URBAN-SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES 1-5 (Rosalind Greenstein & Wim Wiewel eds., 2000). In a
similar vein, the historian Kenneth Jackson documents and criticizes the suburbanization of the
United States in CRABGRASS FRONTIER (1985).
6. The most recent census statistics suggest that, in terms of absolute numbers at least, the net out-
migration from many major cities may have been reversed. In fact, between 1990 and 2000, only
nine of the 50 largest U.S. cities experienced a population decline. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS
2000 REDISTRICTING DATA (2001). For the cities that have gained population during the most recent
census period, the news is still mixed. For the most part, the newcomers tend to have lower incomes
and education levels than the city residents who have left for the suburbs. See, e.g., Kenneth T.
Jackson, Editorial, Once Again, the City Beckons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2001, at A23. See also
Renee Elder, Population Swap Costs Metro; Nashville's Average Income Keeps Falling as Higher-
Income Families Migrate to Suburbs, THE TENNESSEAN, Aug. 19, 1997, at IA. Between 1994 and
1995, for example, 7,600 people moved from central Nashville to outlying suburban areas, while
7,000 people moved in. The new residents had incomes that were 5% lower than the incomes of
those moving out. The resulting decrease in the city's average income will likely increase the
demand for social services while decreasing the government's tax revenues.
7. See Cashin, supra note 5, at 2011.
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few indicia of municipal well-being, the gap continues to widen between
affluent suburbia (now often referred to as the "favored quarter"'") and
the rest of the metropolitan area.
Responding to this well-documented disparity in terms of wealth and
service provision, and loosely connected under the broad doctrinal
umbrella of the New Regionalism," a growing number of commentators
8. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 475, 489-520 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2001), rev'd on other grounds, 744 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678
A.2d 1267, 1272-74 (Conn. 1996).
9. Between 1960 and 1990, the income of central city residents fell from $1.05 for every suburban
dollar earned to $.59. See H.V. Savitch & Ronald K. Vogel, Paths to New Regionalism, 32 ST. &
Loc. GoV'T REV. 160, 162 (2000). One recent study documents the impact on city populations when
suburbanization pulls higher educated and higher earning individuals out of the city. See Paul D.
Gottlieb, The Effects of Poverty on Metropolitan Area Economic Performance, in URBAN-
SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 5, at 36-40. See generally David Rusk, Growth
Management: The Core Regional Issue, in REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM 78 (Bruce Katz ed.,
2000); NEAL PEIRCE, CITISTATES: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD
17-23 (1993).
10. Myron Orfield, a Minnesota state legislator, was the first to document how the city-suburb
schism is more accurately described as a gap between, affluent suburbia (the favored quarter) and the
central city and adjacent ring of older suburbs. See generally MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A
REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997). According to Orfield, all major
metropolitan regions display a remarkably similar distribution of population and wealth: 20-40%
live in central cities; 25-30% in older declining suburbs; 10-15% in low tax base suburbs; and the
remainder, the favored quarter, in high tax base, wealthy suburbs. See Myron Orfield, Conflict or
Consensus? Forty Years of Minnesota Metropolitan Politics, 16 BROOKINGS REV. NO. 4, at 31, 34
(1998). Orfield seeks to promote natural political alliances between central city and older suburbs,
many of which face similar problems with aging infrastructure, high social service needs, increasing
poverty and declining tax base. His recent book, METROPOLITICS, offers a strategy for those who
seek stronger regional governance structures. His recipe for successful regionalization efforts can be
summed up in one piece of advice for the central city: "It's the Older Suburbs, Stupid." Id. at 168.
That phrase captures much of the current political reality of many major metropolitan areas. As the
first ring of suburbs age, he argues, they have begun to show the same signs of decline and decay as
the central city. Influx of the poor, aging infrastructure, and exodus of the mobile middle class to
ever more distant suburbs, is a story told by central city and older suburbs alike. Id. at 47-51. To
capitalize on what he sees as a natural alliance, Orfield recommends joint legislative efforts to seek
the imposition of regional fair housing obligations, property tax sharing, and a redirection of
government infrastructure spending from urban fringe to central city and inner suburban ring. Id. at
78-103. Though in practice, alliances between central cities and older suburbs have proved difficult
to create and sustain, Orfield's critique offers a perspective on regionalism that suggests the political
feasibility of some regional efforts. See also MYRON ORFIELD, CHICAGO METROPOLITICS: A
REGIONAL AGENDA FOR MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 27 (1998). For a recent article in the legal
literature that explores Orfield's theories in depth, see Cashin, supra note 4, at 1987 (describing
favored quarter as "high-growth, developing suburbs that typically represent about a quarter of the
entire regional population but that also tend to capture the largest share of the region's public
infrastructure investments and job growth").
11. See generally, Kathryn A. Foster, Regional Capital, in URBAN-SUBURBAN
INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that as to regional equity, "[a]n influential
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now advocates structural reforms in local governmental law. While some
continue to endorse full city-county consolidation 12 or the creation of a
new regional governmental unit, 3 most recommend more flexible
governance solutions. 4 In the legal literature, the New Regionalism has
yet to emerge as a clearly defined doctrinal movement, yet the term has
begun to appear as a shorthand for the scholarship that examines and
criticizes the allocation of regulatory power among and between state
and local governments in metropolitan areas."5 Calls for full scale
consolidations have largely disappeared, and the focus has shifted to
more limited solutions, including the establishment of a regional
legislature in metropolitan areas, 6 a reformulation of the local franchise
to allow cross-border voting,'7 and the encouragement of voluntary
intermunicipal "burden sharing." 8
empirical focus of the new regionalism tradition now links social equity to economic growth")
(emphasis in original); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Business Coalitions as a Force for Regionalism, in
REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM, supra note 9, at 157-59; Cashin, supra note 5, at 1988 n.11;
Symposium, New Regionalism and Its Policy Agenda, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV'T REV. 158 (2000).
12. See RUSK, supra note 2, at 91-97; Savitch & Vogel, supra note 9, at 162 (describing the
consolidationist approach).
13. See Margaret Weir, Coalition Building for Regionalism, in REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM,
supra note 9, at 127-53; Briffault, supra note 2, at 1165.
14. See Savitch & Vogel, supra note 9, at 161 (defining governance as "the notion that existing
institutions can be harnessed in new ways, that cooperation can be carried out on a fluid and
voluntary basis among localities,.., that people can best regulate themselves through horizontally
linked organizations ... [and that] localities can provide public services without... producing
them"). In contrast to governance, the authors define government as "formal institutions and
elections and established decision-making processes and administrative structures." Id. In fact, many
of the New Regionalists' "governance" proposals involve the creation of a regional special district,
which is a formal institution that exercises many governmental powers and typically has its own
bureaucratic administrative structure. See infra Part III.A.3.
15. See Cashin, supra note 5, at 1988-89 n.l1. In a recent article, Professor Gerald Frug
recognized the evolution of the New Regionalism, but noted that "[i]t is hard to pin down exactly
what new regionalism is." Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763,
1786-87 (2002).
16. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1164-71.
17. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard Briffault,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1188-95 (1996); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 253,273-338(1996).
18. See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 194
(2001). Professor Gillette coined the term for his consideration of interlocal efforts to redistribute
wealth. He describes burden sharing as: "subsidies from some localities (typically suburbs) to others
(typically central cities) that bear disproportionate redistributional burdens .... Such subsidies may
entail accepting a fair share of undesirable land uses or a fair share of residents who need
redistributional services.., or the dedication of tax revenues generated in suburbs to the central
city." Id. Although this Article may have some relevance for the first two types of subsidies
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The current landscape of multiple, fragmented units of local
government is the exclusive province of state law. At least since the
United States Supreme Court's 1907 decision in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh,9 state governments are the undisputed masters of their
political subdivisions. States determine the rules under which local
governments are created, the powers they exercise, and the relationships
they have to the other local governments in the state. In that capacity, the
states have displayed a remarkably uniform unwillingness to force
regional consolidation or regional redistribution of wealth on their
political subdivisions. State statutory frameworks that determine the
rules of local government formation and operation are decidedly anti-
regional. In fact, a variety of legal rules shore up the insular and
insulated status of American municipalities. The ease with which new
governments are formed, the ways in which municipal incorporation
allows a community to capture the wealth derived from its property tax
levy, the general inability of existing municipal governments to annex
development on their borders, and broad municipal powers to regulate
land use development without consideration of its impact on the overall
regional welfare, are a few of the more salient examples.
In apparent contrast to the localist predilection evidenced in those
common state laws, many states have adopted statutes that announce
strong state support for cooperative ventures among and between local
government units.20 In the modem state and local government law
Professor Gillette describes, it focuses primarily on the redistribution of resources that may occur
through intergovernmental cooperative efforts.
19. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
20. See, e.g., ARtz. REV. STAT. § 11-952(A) (2001) ("[i]f authorized by their legislative or other
governing bodies, two or more public agencies by direct contract or agreement may contract for
services or jointly exercise any powers common to the contracting parties and may enter into
agreements with one another for joint or cooperative action or may form a separate legal entity,
including a nonprofit corporation, to contract for or perform some or all of the services specified in
the contract or agreement or exercise those powers jointly held by the contracting parties"); FLA.
STAT. ch. 163.01(2) (2001) ("[i]t is the purpose of this section to permit local govemmental units to
make the most efficient use of their powers by enabling them to cooperate with other localities on a
basis of mutual advantage and thereby to provide services and facilities in a manner and pursuant to
forms of governmental organization that will accord best with geographic, economic, population,
and other factors influencing the needs and development of local communities"); IOWA CODE
§ 28E.4 (2002) ("[any public agency of this state may enter into an agreement with one or more
public or private agencies for joint or co-operative action pursuant to the provisions of this chapter,
including the creation of a separate entity to carry out the purpose of the agreement. Appropriate
action by ordinance, resolution or otherwise pursuant to law of the governing bodies involved shall
be necessary before any such agreement may enter into force"); OR. REV. STAT. § 190.010 (1999)
("[a] unit of local government may enter into a written agreement with any other unit or units of
local government for the performance of any or all functions and activities that a party to the
Washington Law Review
literature, the regionalist critique of intergovernmental cooperation is
either generally positive or neutral. Some, for instance, find value in its
voluntary nature, as well as in the fact that it frequently does not involve
the creation of a new government entity.2' A less enthusiastic assessment
asserts that autonomous and affluent local suburban governments are
unlikely to resort to intergovernmental cooperation to solve intra-
regional disparities.22 In general, though the regionalist commentary may
not see intergovernmental cooperation as likely to enhance overall
metropolitan equity, it typically does not reject intergovernmental efforts
as anti-regional. This Article, in contrast, suggests that that assessment
fails to probe the ways in which intergovernmental cooperation
negatively affects the metropolitan landscape. Building on the suggestion
made recently by Professor Gerald Frug,23 this Article's evaluation of
intergovernmental cooperative efforts leads to the somewhat counter-
intuitive claim that intergovernmental cooperation may actually have a
non-trivial anti-regional impact.
Part II begins with a brief summary of the debate in the legal literature
between localists and regionalists, summarizing their normative bases
and the empirical evidence on which their proposals rest. It then
describes how the emerging New Regionalism builds on the
longstanding disputes between, on the one hand, localists, who favor
significant local government autonomy and object to many
regionalization efforts, and, on the other hand, regionalists, who endorse
varying degrees of curtailment of local autonomy in favor of regionwide
regulatory, fiscal, or general governmental mechanisms. Though it is
easy to identify clear divergences among the localist camps, and between
the localists and those whose viewpoints are better described as
regionalist, a review of the substantive proposals currently offered by
each major doctrinal strain in local government law reveals some
unmistakable convergence. That is, just as the regionalist scholars have
moved away from calls for full scale governmental consolidation in
agreement, its officers or agencies, have authority to perform. The agreement may provide for the
performance of a function or activity"). See also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL SERVICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERING LOCAL PUBLIC
SERVICES: UPDATE 1983 41 (1985) [hereinafter ACIR] (describing how states encourage
intergovernmental cooperation through the use of incentive grants, direct financial assistance for
planning, and technical assistance to local governments).
21. See Cashin, supra note 5, at 2027 (describing New Regionalism); see also Savitch & Vogel,
supra note 9 at 161-65.
22. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1144-51.
23. See Frug, supra note 15, at 1781-88.
Vol. 78:93, 2003
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metropolitan areas, so too the localists have tempered their support of
local autonomy with a recognition of the need for some regionwide
government action and/or apparatus. Thus, the initial parts of this Article
will compare the analytical frameworks and specific proposals of the
predominant strands of scholarship in this area, emphasizing how
regionalism is very much on the minds of local government law scholars,
localists and regionalists alike.
Against that general doctrinal backdrop of the New Regionalism's
tenets, normative bases, and goals, in Part IH the Article focuses
specifically on the role of intergovernmental cooperative efforts in
regional governance. Proceeding to a critique of the most common types,
it evaluates their strengths, weaknesses and policy implications.
Following on that assessment, the Article suggests that the New
Regionalists may have been too quick to conclude that intergovernmental
cooperation is consistent with their stated policy goals. It describes how,
in the existing legal framework, multi-purpose local governments are
able to obtain the purported efficiency benefits of being part of a
metropolitan region. At the same time, though, because the cooperative
efforts are voluntarily undertaken by the participating entities,24 local
governments are able to selectively pick and choose the parts of
metropolitan governance they wish to join. That is, when it comes to
services needing large capital expenditures and a supra-municipal service
territory to reach acceptable levels of efficiency, local governments are
quick to turn to their neighbors to establish regionwide solutions. When
however, the regional agenda focuses on the existing urban crises in
affordable housing, education, job creation, or other social services, the
local government boundaries allow the more affluent municipal
governments to refuse to participate in regional redistributive efforts.
Thus, local governments in metropolitan areas are not required to take
the bad with the good, to bear the costs while they enjoy the benefits of
their position in the metropolitan region. Rather, under the framework
existing in nearly all states, the applicable legal rules enable them to
preserve and solidify their privileged status. Though this system may be
24. Because it focuses on intergovernmental cooperative efforts, this Article does not consider
single purpose governments that are created directly by state action. See generally Hoogasian v.
Reg'l Transp. Auth., 317 N.E.2d 534 (Ill. 1974). For a full description of the various types of special
districts existing across the country, see Kathryn A. Foster, The Political Economy of Special-
Purpose Government, in AMERICAN GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 7-15 (Barry Rabe & John
Tierny eds., 1997).
Washington Law Review
perfectly consistent with their perceived self interest25 and with
established state and federal26 legal doctrine, it vastly limits the
opportunities and incentives for redistribution of wealth at the regional
level, and contributes to the preservation of inequalities within the
region.
This Article recognizes that wholesale abandonment of
intergovernmental cooperation among general purpose local
governments is even less likely to occur than the consolidation proposals
the New Regionalism seeks to replace. Nor does the Article endorse such
an unlikely reformulation of local government powers. Instead, it more
modestly urges heightened awareness of the regional costs of
intergovernmental cooperation and the ways in which it may actually
hinder the achievement of regional equity. It joins the ranks of those who
have argued that overall metropolitan equity cannot be achieved through
voluntary cooperative efforts and calls for states to take action to correct
the gap that their laws and urban policies have facilitated and preserved.
II. THE MANY FACES OF REGIONALISM
Though the term means different things to different people,
regionalism is enjoying a revival on both the academic and political
fronts. As it subjects metropolitan regions to reexamination with renewed
vigor and enthusiasm, the New Regionalism may be a "mixed bag of old
prescriptions and new remedies to address problems both new and
longstanding., 27 Refining the regionalists' traditional focus on the central
city and its decline, New Regionalists expand their scrutiny to consider
25. See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 27 (2000) (noting that
resistance to regionalism in the political process is "largely a matter of the self-interest of those who
benefit from the status quo, such as local elected officials, land developers, corporations that are the
subjects of interlocal bidding, and the businesses and residents located in the high-tax base localities
of the metropolitan area"). Briffault observes that in practice, localism is less about the normative
values of efficiency, democracy, or community, and more about "preserving existing political
control over local resources, protecting residents of high wealth localities from the needs of their
lower-wealth neighbors, and providing opportunities for businesses to take advantage of the
interlocal competition for tax base." Id.
26. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 86-111 (1990) for a detailed analysis of how U.S. Supreme Court doctrine
protects local autonomy and applies localist values to uphold local government actions with
decidedly anti-regional impacts, specifically in the areas of land use regulation and education
finance.
27. Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Regionalism, Localism, and Metropolitan
Governance: Suggestions from the Research Program on Local Public Economies, 32 ST. & LOC.
GOV'T REv. 169, 169 (2000).
Vol. 78:93, 2003
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how the phenomenon of suburban growth forms a crucial part of urban
and metropolitan development. The resulting endeavor, which searches
for solutions to metropolitan problems in the absence of metropolitan
governments, has become, in the words of noted commentators, "so
proactive, so compelling, so urgent."2
A. In Defense of Local Government Fragmentation
Local government law has been the focus of a long and rich debate
between localists and regionalists, a debate that seeks to determine the
proper allocation of governmental power by the state to its political
subdivisions.29 In the modem era, the post-World War II baby boom and
28. Savitch & Vogel, supra note 9, at 161.
29. The debate over whether decentralized, independent local government units are preferable to
centralized, higher level government units was left unresolved at the founding of the nation. As a
result, it is no surprise that the debate has continued unabated to the present. Though the Constitution
makes no mention of local governments, their creation, or their status, foundational writings
articulate the differing viewpoints on the debate between local autonomy and more centralized levels
of government power. James Madison, writing in the Federalist Papers, defended centralization of
governmental power to protect against the tyranny of the majority. In his view, it is more difficult for
a faction to control a centralized unit of government than a smaller, more decentralized one. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 at 46-47 (James Madison) (Gary Willis ed., 1982). Moreover, he asserted,
because a higher level of government has a larger territory and higher population within its territorial
jurisdiction, it is more likely that government offices will be filled with qualified individuals. See id.
at 47. Though Madison's arguments were directed at the debate between allocation of power
between the states and the national government, his insights on the dispute over the vertical
allocation of power have broader relevance for the debate over the allocation of power at the local
level, particularly in large metropolitan areas. In contrast to Madison's endorsement of
centralization, Alexis de Tocqueville's commentaries on early 19th century America made the
classic case for localism. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (G. Lawrence trans.,
J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) (1848). Tocqueville's preference for decentralization of power to the levels of
government closest to the people were based on his belief that local government provides greater,
rather than lesser, protection against the tyranny of powerful interests. See id. at 89. Fundamentally,
the strength of local government in Tocqueville's analysis lies in the ease with which the citizenry
can participate in government when power is centered at the local level. See id. at 68-70, 189-95. In
Tocqueville's view, active local governments, with their ability to entice citizen participation
because of their direct and immediate contact with the citizenry, provided the crucial protection
against tyranny. See id. at 192. Though views of both Tocqueville and Madison were formulated at a
time when population centers were separated by large distances and the impacts of their decisions
could largely be limited to the territory and the people under their jurisdiction, the insights and the
arguments articulated in this early localism debate have continuing endurance for current urban
policy. For a review of the philosophical and historical underpinnings of the decentralization debate
in local government law, see generally WILLIAM D. VALENTE, DAVID J. MCCARTHY, JR., RICHARD
BRIFFAULT AND LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1-24 (5th ed. 2001);
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 11-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346,
403-04, 416,(1990); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1071-73
(1980); Cashin, supra note 4, at 1986-87.
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the accompanying explosive growth of suburbia" produced a new
demographic reality for the localism debate. Central cities found
themselves surrounded by increasing numbers of municipal
governments, autonomous in the sense that they were able to control the
territory and tax the resources within their borders, but integrated in the
sense that they were a functional part of the metropolitan region. The
well-documented loss of central city wealth and families to the suburbs
and the inability of cities to share in the suburban prosperity that was
occurring all around them, set the stage for the most recent iteration of
the battle between localists and regionalists.
Localism is most prominently defended by two distinct doctrinal
camps that come together in their conclusion that strong local
governments are highly preferable to centralization in metropolitan
regions. However, the two localist doctrines are based on divergent
political ideologies. First, the so-called "public choice" approach, as
articulated in the work of Professor Clayton Gillette,a' uses legal
economic analysis to defend localism as the most efficient way of
providing services. It heralds the competition in the marketplace of local
governments as providing effective checks against government
inefficiencies and abuses of power. In marked contrast, Professor Gerald
Frug's "participation theory"32 of localism rejects the notion that a city's
most fundamental role is that of service provider3 and urges enhanced
local powers as a mechanism for empowering communities and their
30. For a description of the ways in which the housing market responded to a shortage of
approximately 6,000,000 housing units in 1947, see JACKSON, supra note 5, at 231-45. Professor
Jackson identified five characteristics of the postwar suburbs: increasingly distant from central cities,
low density development, architectural sameness in construction, low prices associated with mass
production, and racial and economic homogeneity. See id. The growth of suburbia continues to
outpace central city growth. See id. at 283.
31. I use the term "public choice" as a shorthand convenience to describe generally those whose
work finds support in Charles Tiebout's theory, which is described infra at notes 35-38 and text
accompanying. Professor Gillette's work constitutes the most prominent articulation of the Tiebout
theory as applied to questions about distribution of powers to local government in the legal literature,
yet he seems to take issue with the use of the term. In a recent article, Professor Gillette referred to
another commentator's "critique of what he labels the 'public choice approach' to interlocal
relationships." Gillette, supra note 18, at 246. 1 use the term here with the purely descriptive intent
described above.
32. In Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory, supra note 29, at 346, 393-94,
Professor Briffault used that term to describe the theory of localism propounded by Professor Frug.
In the urban development literature, one study uses "metropolitan ecology" as a term to describe
Frug-like belief "in the importance of local autonomy and small-scale governance," see Foster,
supra note 24, at 44-47. Professor Frug does not label his own theory.
33. See generally Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 28 (1998).
Vol. 78:93, 2003
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citizens through meaningful involvement in grass roots levels of
government.34 Both models continue to animate the localism debate as it
turns its attention to the metropolitan regions of the 21st century.
Published in 1956, Charles Tiebout's A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures35 remains the seminal academic foundation of the economic
defense of localism in urban government. According to Tiebout's model,
local governments will strive to provide a desired mix of services in
order to retain their constituents, the individual citizens whom he
described as "consumer-voters."3 Competition between and among
government units should produce greater efficiency in the provision of
public services as well as more variety in the range and level of services
offered by different government units. Crucial to Tiebout's theory was
the ability of citizen consumers to translate their preferences for a
particular mix of public services into a choice of local government by
exercising their power of "exit," thereby ensuring ongoing competition
among municipalities to attract and retain taxpayer citizens. Although
Tiebout did not take a position in the political debate between localism
and greater centralization in metropolitan America, his theories led to the
conclusion that a greater number of competing local government units
would produce higher citizen satisfaction and greater government
efficiency. Successive generations of scholars have modified and refined
Tiebout's theory,37 yet the basic premises continue as the foundation for
34. Compare the following two assertions about the proper scope of local governmental power;
they illustrate well the ideological chasm between the two approaches. On the one hand, the public
choice theory rests on the normative claim that: "The primary function of a municipality is to
provide local public goods." Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE
L. J. 75, 88 (1998). In contrast, Professor Frug's defense of localism on the basis of participation
insists that: "IT]he role that cities ought to play in American society ... is community building."
Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1996). By community
building, Frug means "the cultivation and reproduction of the city's traditional form of human
association." Id. at 1077.
35. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
36. Id. at 419.
37. Professor Clayton Gillette is the leading exponent of Tiebout's theory in the legal literature.
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DEN. U. L. REv. 1185 (1996)
(applying Tiebout's theory to the privatization of municipal services.). At the same time, Gillette has
frequently recognized that Tiebout's assumptions do not reflect current realities. See, e.g., Gilette,
supra note 18, at 197-210; Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A
Cautionary Note, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 37, 40 (1996) (recognizing that "the Tiebout world, however,
is obviously not the world in which we live"); Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and
Communities U. CHI. L. REv. 1375, 1389 n.59 (1994) (noting that Tiebout's model predicts the
correct allocation of public services only so long as a series of externalities, and choice among
substantial numbers of localities); Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of
Municipal Services, 100 HARV. L. REv. 946, 956 (1986) (stating that the documented inequality of
municipal services provision itself disproves the assumptions underlying the Tiebout hypothesis).
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those who herald the efficiency advantages of decentralization of power
to local governments and reject arguments for regionalization or
centralization of governments in metropolitan areas.38
Scholars have criticized Tiebout's theory from two main vantage
points. Some question the accuracy of Tiebout's assumptions about
human behavior, while others disagree with the theory's normative bases
and practical results. Various commentators, for instance, have
challenged the premise that local government units are formed to provide
a specific mix and level of services. They point to evidence that local
governments are often created for the sole, less benign, purpose of
excluding poor and minority residents.39 Others have rejected Tiebout's
assumption that individuals choose a municipal home that satisfies their
desires for a particular mix and level of services, noting that choice is an
inaccurate term to describe the plight of the poor who live with
inadequate service levels.4 ° Critics also fault Tiebout for ignoring how
the costs of exercising that choice fall disproportionately on those with
the fewest resources.4 They question too whether the much noted lack of
More recently, Professor Lee Anne Fennell has documented the limits of both exit and voice in the
economic analysis of local government services. See Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice:
User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2001). Professor
Fennell asserts that the exit-voice phenomena cannot capture the fact that local citizens have a dual
role, as both consumers and producers, with regard to important services such as schools and public
safety. See id. at 11-12.
38. See Ellickson, supra note 34, at 82-85; Gillette, supra note 18, at 208-10.
39. See, e.g., NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE
VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 117 (1994) (noting how the formation of local government units
creates boundaries that exclude others, she claims "Americans have discovered in local institutions
effective barriers to racial and economic integration"); GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT 63-
84 (1981) (describing how wealthy enclaves use municipal incorporation to avoid redistribution of
wealth to poorer citizens; concluding that city formation in these cases "had little to do with the
gratification of distinct collective tastes for public goods." For additional economically based
criticism of Tiebout, see generally Foster, supra note 24, at 39-41.
40. Moving is an expensive proposition, both in terms of the financial costs and the personal costs
it imposes on citizens. As Professor Frug has noted, "[p]eople who live in unsafe neighborhoods or
send their children to inadequate schools don't do so because they have taste for them .... If they
had a choice .... they would prefer better schools and less crime." See Frug, supra note 33, at 31.
Along those same lines, some have rejected the Tiebout theory because of its unrealistic assumption
of full knowledge on the part of citizens. See GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS:
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 17 (A. Gary Dworkin ed., 1991).
41. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 29, at 420 (stressing that the exercise of the choice of
municipality comes at different prices to different citizens). For the poor, the costs of moving, the
constraints imposed by the need to be close to jobs, and the limited availability of affordable housing
in many municipalities means that "poorer, less educated potential movers will have fewer options
and will be forced to bear more costs if they attempt to move." Id. See also id. at 422 (noting that
wealthy communities, with their high levels of property wealth, can tax at low rates and generate
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affordable housing in suburban areas makes moving an illusion even for
many moderate income individuals who are willing and able to assume
the costs of the move.42 And finally, even some who share Tiebout's
enthusiasm for the role of market mechanisms in achieving efficiency in
the provision of public services suggest that the theory improperly
emphasizes the consumer-voter's likely exercise of choice in the
selection of local government. Instead of focusing exclusively on the
threat of "exit," they argue, the theory should recognize the importance
of citizen "voice" in motivating local government officials.43
The second line of critical attack on Tiebout's model questions the
normative acceptability of the metropolitan landscape the theory
produces. Though the criticism is wide-ranging, it coalesces around four
main points. First, the critique asserts the highly fragmented local
government world envisioned by Tiebout inevitably results in a self-
destructive competitive "race to the bottom," as municipalities try to out-
bid each other in the incentives they are willing to offer to entice
business and the property wealth it brings into their jurisdictions.'
Second, it allows self-contained local government units in a metropolitan
region to take actions with negative spillover impacts on their
neighbors. 5 Third, in the view of some critics, Tiebout's depiction of
local communities as aggregations of like-minded individuals primarily
concerned with the consumption of public services denigrates and
trivializes humanity and ignores other important local government
functions. 6 Finally, some commentators argue that Tiebout's theory
unacceptably assumes, indeed encourages, socioeconomic segregation
and the preservation of the widening gap between wealthy suburb and
substantially more revenue than poor communities that tax at a much higher rate). See also Miller,
supra note 39, at 204-06.
42. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 420.
43. See, e.g., Parks & Oakerson, supra note 27, at 173-75. The importance of voice in
determining the mix of services offered by a local government was first described in ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
STATES 30-43, 120-26 (1970). See also supra notes 37-38.
44. See Frug, supra note 33, at 33-34.
45. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1132-33; Briffault, supra note 29, at 429-30. This critique
applies to both Frug's and Tiebout's theories of localism. As a matter of political theory, it argues,
localism is flawed. Because government decisions should be made at the level that is coterminous
with the impacts of its decision, for many issues, the region or metropolitan level is the proper level
for decisionmaking. See Briffault, supra note 25, at 20-23.
46. See Frug, supra note 33, at 28-31. Professor Frug bemoans Tiebout's reliance on the dues-
paying mentality of citizenship and its abandonment of norms of equality, "replacing the one-person,




In contrast to Tiebout's efficiency based analysis, the second
prominent localist doctrine rests on the conception of local government
as the place where democratic ideals can most easily be realized. This
participation theory of localism originated in the modern legal literature
with Professor Gerald Frug's 1980 publication of The City as a Legal
Concept.4" That article has become a classic in local government law
scholarship as a preeminent justification of localism. Though Frug favors
the same redistribution of wealth as many of those scholars who support
centralization of power as a means towards that end,49 he views highly
centralized levels of government as unresponsive, ineffective, and
impersonal. In this view, centralized governments are incapable of
building the sense of community so necessary to defeat the alienation
and loss of collective well-being that plague modern metropolitan areas.
Municipal governments could offer the opportunity for community
building and meaningful participation, Frug asserts, but the rules of local
government law make them powerless.5 In turn, city powerlessness
produces citizen apathy and destroys their incentive to participate in local
government. Without grassroots participation in local government,
powerful elites are able to exercise real power at the expense of the
community's broader collective interest. In Frug's view, then, enhanced
local power will both increase the individual's connectedness with and
involvement in the business of government, and achieve higher levels of
social justice and equality."1
47. See PEIRCE, supra note 9, at 17 (arguing that the huge socioeconomic gap between poor cities
and wealthy suburbs constitutes a major barrier to economic prosperity); WEIHER, supra note 40, at
87-115 (1991) (political fragmentation produces segregation along municipal borders); Briffault,
supra note 29, at 420, 425 (criticizing public choice model for its acceptance and reinforcement of
inequality among local government units); Frug, supra note 33, at 33-35 (criticizing ability of
wealthy suburbs to enhance wealth by excluding poor and spending tax revenues only on
themselves).
48. Frug, supra note 29. For a fuller exploration of Frug's localism, see generally GERALD E.
FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999).
49. Gerald E. Frug, Against Centralization, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 31, 32 (2000) (critiquing the view
that centralization is the only alternative to the current fragmentation of America's metropolitan
areas).
50. See Frug, supra note 29, at 1062-67. Frug describes how cities are subject to the states'
absolute discretion to delegate power to municipal governments and how federal constitutional limits
have similarly weakened municipal authority. Id.
51. Professor Richard Thompson Ford has also championed the preservation of local autonomy
while recognizing the negative consequences of local insularity in metropolitan regions. He opposes
the creation of regional governments, because he believes that "we will lose the opportunities for
participatory, or at least responsive, democratic government, effective place based political
initiatives, and civic interaction and identification with the public sphere. Meanwhile government
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As Frug's theory has acquired prominence, his premises have been
questioned on several fronts. In his important articles on localism,52
Professor Richard Briffault argued that Frug's description of city
powerlessness does not reflect the political reality of major metropolitan
regions.5 3 In Briffault's view, affluent suburban governments, far from
displaying the powerlessness Frug bemoaned, actually exercise
substantial autonomy and independence.54 Second, Briffault rejected
Frug's assertions that localism will enhance citizen participation or local
autonomy, arguing (1) that the presence of a large number of small local
governments in metropolitan regions narrows, rather than increases, the
range of local powers; and (2) that citizens in metropolitan regions have
bonds to numerous jurisdictions, thus weakening the ties with a home
city that the localist theory envisions.5 Third, Briffault challenged the
will become more distant, more bureaucratic and less responsive." See Ford, supra note 17, at 1184.
For Professor Ford's proposals to make local borders "permeable" through a system of cross border
voting, see Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Peolitical Geography in the Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841,1909-10 (1994).
52. See Briffault, supra note 26; Briffault, supra note 29.
53. See Briffault, supra note 26, at 1-3, 56; Briffault, supra note 29, at 389-406.
54. See Briffault, supra note 26, at 18-58. Using school financing schemes and land use
regulation as examples, Briffault asserted that local powerlessness exists more as a matter of legal
doctrine than as a description of the ways in which the favored quarter currently exists in most states.
The allocation of local government powers in major metropolitan areas, he argued, has created
powerful, affluent suburban municipalities with significant autonomy and control over the wealth
within their territorial borders and over the course of development that territory will follow. In
contrast to the black letter law of local powerlessness at the whim of the state creator, Briffault
showed how common state statutory schemes for local government incorporation, see id. at 73-77,
annexation, consolidation, see id. at 77-81, and home rule, see id. at 9-11, display a commitment to
local autonomy.
Similarly, Briffault's analysis of the Supreme Court's deference to local autonomy in a variety of
cases revealed similar staunch support of local insularity. Using a variety of justifications, the Court
has upheld local power against attack from different quarters. For instance, in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974), the Court appeared to rely on a notion of local government as an
autonomous community with the power to maintain the community character it desires. Briffault
discussed a number of cases displaying similar localist tendencies. See Briffault, supra note 26, at
86-96. In Briffault's view, the Court elevated the autonomous status of local governments above the
interests of those who were adversely affected by their actions. Based on his review of the Court's
opinions, Briffault concluded that not only is the localist claim of local powerlessness inaccurate as a
descriptive matter, it has also ignored the many ways in which local governments have been able to
exercise power so as to impose negative extraterritorial impacts on other areas within the
metropolitan region. See id. at 109-11.
55. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 407. In a similar vein, others have pointed to the loss of sense
of place, and the alienation and dulling sameness of suburban communities. See, e.g., RICHARD MOE
& CARTER WILKIE, CHANGING PLACES: REBUILDING COMMUNITY IN THE AGE OF SPRAWL (1997);
Bruce Katz & Jennifer Bradley, Divided We Sprawl, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, available at
www.theatlantic.com/atlantic/issues/99dec/9912katz.htm (Dec. 1999); James Howard Kunstler,
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claim that enhanced local powers will result in redistribution of wealth,
pointing out that local governments now have and always have had the
power to redistribute and arguing that their failure to engage in greater
redistribution is explained, not by a lack of power, but rather by their fear
of losing high tax-paying citizens.56 Finally, some of the normative
critique leveled at the Tiebout theory applies to Frug's participation
theory as well. That is, the critics question Frug's underlying judgment
that municipalities should receive enhanced powers to act in
metropolitan regions. They note the spillover effects of many local
decisions, suggesting that enhanced local power in the metropolitan
setting improperly allows an individual unit of government to impose
negative costs on neighboring local governments.57 According to that
critique, localism becomes a perpetrator of inequalities rather than a
mechanism for maximizing the community's overall welfare.58
B. Regionalist Solutions for Metropolitan Localism
Professor Richard Briffault's path-breaking articles brought
regionalism squarely front and center in the local government law
literature. In Our Localism-Part P9 and Part I1,60 both published in 1990,
Briffault offered an extensive critique of localism and its consequences
for overall metropolitan well-being. First, Briffault turned his attention to
a rebuttal of the localists' claim of local powerlessness, documenting the
very real and important local government powers routinely exercised by
Home From Nowhere, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, available at
www.theatlantic.com/atlantic/issues/96sep/ kunstler/kunstler.htm (Sept. 1996).
56. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 407-10. Another commentator has taken this critique one step
further, rejecting the basic underlying assumption of the participation theory of localism that local
governments are "natural benevolent institutions that are the perfect training ground for democratic
citizens." See BURNS, supra note 40, at 116. In contrast, Bums argues that local governments are
often created for anti-democratic, exclusionary reasons. See id.
57. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 426-28; Cashin, supra note 5, at 2012-15; Briffault, supra
note 2, at 116-17; Briffault, supra note 26, at 6-7.
58. Under this view, one possible solution short of total metropolitan area consolidation would be
the creation of a regional government unit with the power to address only those policy matters with
substantial region wide effects. See Briffault, supra note 25, at 21-22 ("In metropolitan areas,
democracy requires giving the regional electorate a voice in local decisions that have regional
consequences. Only by widening the scale of participation to include all those affected by local
actions can local decision-making in metropolitan regions be made truly democratic.").
59. Briffault, supra note 26, at 1.
60. Briffault, supra note 29, at 407. Since publication of the Localism articles, Professor
Briffault's defense of regionalism has been a constant theme of his scholarship. In particular, two
later articles elucidate the normative bases and describe the solutions he suggests for implementation
of a regionalist agenda. See generally Briffault, supra note 25; Briffault, supra note 2.
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municipal governments across the country.6 In the second part of the
work, Briffault's Localism rejected the normative assumptions of localist
doctrine.62 Finally, Briffault offered some tentative suggestions for
reform of the localism dilemma in metropolitan America. As described
in Localism as well as in later articles, he concluded that the formation of
a regionwide, politically accountable local government unit is the only
realistic means of ensuring that the impacts of government decisions in
metropolitan areas are coterminous with their political boundaries.63
Noting that neither the small size of existing local governments nor their
sheer numbers in metropolitan areas was itself inconsistent with regional
well-being, Briffault stressed that his critique was based on the ease and
frequency with which local governments in metropolitan areas are able to
take actions whose impacts extend far beyond their borders. 6  In his
view, then, regional government units are necessary, not as a substitute
for nor as a consolidation of existing local governments, but rather as an
additional, politically accountable legislative body, whose functions
would be limited to issues with demonstrable regionwide impacts.65 As
he recently noted, "[R]egionalism is . . . localism for metropolitan
areas."
66
For a large number of commentators, Briffault's work offered
tantalizing possibilities for ways in which social policies could be
improved with regionalist solutions. The 1990s saw a resurgence of
61. Briffault, supra note 29, at 392-435. See also supra notes 39-47, 52-58, and accompanying
text.
62. That critique has been described in this Article's earlier review of localism. See supra Part
II.A. Briffault's critique of the public choice defense of a marketplace of municipal governments in
competition for citizens asserts that it is based on erroneous assumptions about human behavior and
inaccurate assessments about the freedom of many individuals to act as an enlightened consumer in
the choice of municipal service provider. See supra notes 38-47, and accompanying text. Though
Frug's participation defense of local government was sensitive to and critical of the ways in which
affluent autonomous localities can preserve their privilege and imposed costs on other local
government territories in the region, Briffault concluded that the theory is, like Tiebout's approach,
seriously flawed. In Briffault's view, Frug's localism is based on a misguided perception of the local
government as community and home for the vast majority of suburban Americans, rather than one
that perpetuates inequalities within a region. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
Fundamentally, he claimed, both localist theories ignore the harm caused when the impacts of the
local governments' exercise of power extend far beyond their borders, exacerbating regional
inequalities. See id.
63. See Briffault, supra note 25; Briffault, supra note 2.
64. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 426-30.
65. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1165.
66. Briffault, supra note 25, at 1. Crucial powers to be exercised at the regional level, in
Briffault's view, include land use, local taxation, and service provisions that could be enhanced with
a supra-municipal territorial base. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1166.
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regionalist proposals. One author, for instance, argued that regional
government is the sine qua non of an effective policy to combat
poverty.67 Another asserted that low and moderate income housing policy
is doomed to failure without regional control of land use and taxation
powers.6" Yet another commentator urged the establishment of a regional
tax base. She argued that regionwide taxation would more evenly
distribute resources and spread the costs of the negative impacts
associated with high levels of urbanization and concentrated poverty.69
For these scholars, regional efforts are preferred because of their
potential to promote equity and social justice. In their view, regional
action is the only way to combat metropolitan America's pronounced
racial segregation and sharp disparities in local wealth, local tax bases,
and the quality of local services.
Though many scholars, policy analysts, and urban planners agree that
regional approaches are preferable to the status quo, regionalization has
its critics as well. Especially when regionalism is defined as advocating
the creation of a new general purpose regionwide government, localists
argue that regionalism would unwisely deprive citizens of their choice of
service providers. In their view, it also would eliminate the advantage of
having a large number of small government units that compete to attract
citizens by differentiating themselves with the type and quality of
services they offer.7" Others assert that bigger government brings a
reduced sense of community empowerment and decreases government
responsiveness.7" Moreover, the political hurdles are enormous.
Entrenched local government bureaucracies and the apparent public
preference for continued suburbanization are but two of the major
obstacles to metropolitan governance.72 In the view of one commentator,
67. In Paul Boudreaux, E Pluribus Unum Urbs: An Exploration of the Potential Benefits of
Metropolitan Government on Efforts to Assist Poor Persons, 5 VA. J. SOc. POL'Y & L. 471, 502-19
(1998), the author argued that a regional government structure is necessary to combat poverty.
68. See Peter Salsich Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable Housing and Neighborhood
Development, 28 STETSON L. REv. 577, 580, 600-05 (1999).
69. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Redistribution of
Poverty-Related Expenses, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 24-30 (1995).
70. For a recent articulation of the case against regionalism, see Gillette, supra note 18, at 197-
210.
71. See Frug. supra note 29, at 1062-67.
72. Briffault identified the enormous practical political barriers to the implementation of his
regional agenda. Fundamentally, he observed, "Localists do not become regionalists simply because
they live in metropolitan regions." Briffault, supra note 25, at 2. Existing local bureaucracies are not
likely to support relinquishment of significant regulatory and taxing powers. Nor are many segments
of the private sector, such as "land developers, corporations, .. .and the businesses and residents
located in the high-tax base localities," id. at 27, likely to agree to reorganization of the government
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it is the minds of the American public, and not the governmental
framework in which it operates, that imposes the major barrier to
regionalism: "[I]t is unlikely that any structural innovation, like the
establishment of metropolitan government" can change the political and
social attitudes that have led to segregated suburbs; the need is not "to
recast the structure of municipal government, but.., to revise the
preferences of the American people; in this area, organizational reform
cannot substitute for the alteration of popular predilections. 73
C. Framing the New Regionalism Inquiry
In various branches of urban development studies, academic
commentators have heralded the arrival of the New Regionalism.74 Like
many of its doctrinal predecessors, the New Regionalism is an outgrowth
of earlier metropolitan strategies; it is a term that catches a wide range of
ideologies within its sweep. In general, however, those who congregate
under the broad umbrella of the New Regionalism have focused their
attention on the disparities between central city and favored quarter: in
terms of wealth, job creation, earning power, and racial and socio-
economic integration, the central city and the inner suburban ring are
falling dramatically behind their wealthy suburban counterparts.75 From a
historical perspective, the New Regionalism turns its attention to the
radical transformation of major metropolitan areas that began in post-
World War II America. It confronts an urban landscape that displays a
continually growing number of local government units located at ever
bureaucracies in which they have prospered. Thus, identifying an appropriate entity for the drawing
of the regional boundaries would itself be a controversial and intensely political issue. Finally,
Briffault recognized, many metropolitan regions span two or more states, bringing an interstate
complication to the regionalist solution. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1167.
73. See Edward Zelinsky, Metropolitanism. Progressivism, and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 665,
667 (1998); see also Anita Summers, Regionalization Efforts Between Big Cities and Their Suburbs,
in URBAN-SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 5, at 181 (noting failure of most
consolidation votes); Robert D. Yaro, Growing and Governing Smart: A Case Study of the New York
Region, in REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM, supra note 9, at 44, 70-71.
74. See Cashin, supra note 5, at 1988; Foster, supra note 11, at 83; Savitch & Vogel, supra note
9, at 158-61. See also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
75. Commentators have defined New Regionalism as "a set of policies designed to reduce
inequality arising from the way the metropolis developed and to improve the overall quality of life."
See H.V. Savitch & Ronald K. Vogel, Metropolitan Consolidation Versus Metropolitan Governance
in Louisville, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV'T REv. 198 (2000). Other authors have noted New Regionalism's
focus on reducing the gap between urban core and favored quarter. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 11,
at 85 (noting that New Regionalism "links social equity to economic growth"); Bennett Harrison, It
Takes a Region (or Does It?): The Material Basis for Metropolitanism and Metropolitics, in URBAN-
SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 5, at 143-45.
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increasing distances from central cities. It documents the undisputed gap
between suburban prosperity and central city decline. At the same time,
however, it notes the repeated failure of local government consolidation
efforts in major metropolitan areas and stresses the permanence of
existing multi-purpose local governments. Thus, it looks for regional
answers to metropolitan area inequalities through a lens that is tempered
with the pragmatic realization that proposals to eliminate existing local
government units are unlikely to succeed.
Though loosely united in their articulation of policy goals, the New
Regionalists embrace a wide range of divergent strategies. In fact, rather
than a cohesive ideology with a well-accepted policy agenda, New
Regionalism refers more precisely to shared concerns and goals for
metropolitan area equity. At the level of specific proposals, the variety is
significant. Though some continue to advocate consolidation between
central city and the county it inhabits, most New Regionalists reject the
so-called "big box" government approach76 in favor of more flexible,
informal, governance arrangements.77 Examining possible solutions such
as the "multitiered ' 78 approach, "linked functions,, 79  or "complex
76. See, e.g., Mark S. Rosentraub, City-County Consolidation and the Rebuilding of Image: The
Fiscal Lessons from Indianapolis's UniGov Program, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV'T REV. 180, 189-90
(2000) (concluding that Indianapolis's revival could have happened without consolidation, noting the
many other factors that produced economic growth and pointing out that the fastest growing areas in
the Indianapolis region are beyond the borders of UniGov); Savitch & Vogel, supra note 75, at 210
(concluding that consolidation in the Louisville area would not achieve metropolitan equity). One
study of several city-county consolidations concluded that supporters of consolidation do not seek to
equalize suburban-city disparities. Successful consolidation agendas focused on "local services,
governmental 'turf,' taxes, and race"). See Arnold Fleischmann, Regionalism and City-County
Consolidation in Small Metro Areas, 32 ST. & Loc. Gov'T REv. 213-24 (2000). An analysis of the
Jacksonville, Florida consolidation concluded that the benefits of consolidation are overstated. See
Bert E. Swanson, Quandaries of Pragmatic Reform: A Reassessment of the Jacksonville Experience,
32 ST. & Loc. GOV'T REv. 227, 236 (2000). In contrast to the pervasive anti-consolidation approach
to metropolitan regions, David Rusk continues to advocate large scale local government
consolidation in metropolitan areas. Rusk, the former mayor of Albuquerque, has become a vocal
proponent of metropolitan governments. He urges state governments to consider four different
approaches: 1) unifying local governments, either by empowering urban counties, by consolidating
county and municipal governments, or by creating a regional government that extends throughout
the multiple cities and counties that comprise most major metropolitan areas; 2) authorizing
municipal annexation without approval of property owners; 3) limiting the creation of new
municipalities; and 4) promoting public partnerships for joint action among local governments.
Rusk, supra note 2, at 90-102.
77. A recent symposium issue on the New Regionalism explored these and other proposals for
regional redistribution of wealth, service provision, and regulatory powers. See Symposium, New
Regionalism, supra note 11.
78. See Savitch & Vogel, supra note 9, at 162-63. The multitiered approach to regionalism
allocates power among existing and/or new layers of government according to the scope of the
impact of the power being exercised. Metropolitan area government "is supposed to better deal with
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networks,"" ° they tend to endorse the establishment of limited purpose
governments or the execution of voluntary intergovernmental agreements
over proposals for wholesale consolidation of existing units of
government. As a result, New Regionalism offers a middle ground for
the dispute over the allocation of state and local government power. It
attracts localists by recognizing that large scale consolidations are
unlikely to be a successful political strategy, and that large numbers of
local governments are an enduring feature of the metropolitan region. At
the same time, New Regionalism appeals to the critics of localism, by
documenting the ways in which fragmented local government authority
and the phenomenon of suburbanization have contributed to central city
decline and a widening gap between urban core and affluent suburbia.
1. The Normative Bases of the New Regionalism
Though the New Regionalists may agree about the ultimate goals for
metropolitan America, the normative claims on which their arguments
rest are quite diverse. At least four criteria underlie their proposals:
efficiency, economic interdependence, participatory democracy, and
equity."' With regard to economic efficiency, the New Regionalist
questions the traditional public choice localist claim that a multiplicity of
autonomous local governments maximizes local wealth and efficiency by
forcing local government units to compete with each other to attract
citizen taxpayers. They point to recent empirical studies that suggest that
fragmentation actually creates inefficiencies by allowing local
governments to impose costs on others, and by allowing suburbs to
issues that cut across a number of local jurisdictions or involve redistributive policies." Id. at 163.
Lower level, municipal governments retain control over "labor-intensive services, which call for
close relationships between service deliverers and citizen-consumers." Id. at 162. The authors note
that metropolitan level governments "often find themselves crushed between the grindstones of local
and higher levels of government" and conclude that their record is mixed. Id. at 163.
79. See id. This approach results in a functional consolidation for service provision across
jurisdictions, usually through the formation of interlocal service agreements. No new levels of
government are required. In practice, the authors claim that linked functions are frequently perceived
as an incomplete, temporary solution to a regional problem. For a review of the experiences of
several cities that have used the linked functions approach, see Timothy D. Mead, Governing
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 32 ST. & Loc. Gov'T REv. 192, 194-96 (2000); Savitch & Vogel, supra
note 75, at 198-212.
80. See Savitch & Vogel, supra note 9, at 164 (defining complex networks as "large numbers of
independent govemments (voluntarily) cooperating through multiple, overlapping webs of interlocal
agreements"). Complex networks produce "numerous jurisdictions with overlapping services," id.,
thus maximizing the citizens' range of choices.
81. See Valente et al., supra note 29, at 350-52; Briffault, supra note 25, at 15-26; Cashin, supra
note 5, at 2042-47. See also Summers, supra note 73, at 182.
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maximize their own wealth at the expense of the central city they
surround.8" The New Regionalists also claim that excessive
fragmentation of local government units establishes barriers to the
efficient provision of some services.83 In metropolitan areas especially, a
large territorial base would better distribute the costs of infrastructure
and produce a higher quality, if not less expensive, service.84 Currently,
nearly all participants in the New Regionalist debate appear to concur
that some type of regionwide action would enhance regional efficiency
and provide a necessary antidote to extensive local autonomy.
The second regionalist norm, the asserted economic interdependence
of the metropolitan region, rests on evidence that suburban economic
well-being suffers as the gap between suburb and city widens. According
to the suggested "interdependence imperative,"85 central city health
becomes an item of suburban self-interest; suburbia ignores the fate of
the city at its peril and to the detriment of its own prosperity. One well
known commentator has identified numerous ways in which suburban
welfare depends on a strong central city, including: (1) central city image
is crucial to regional welfare; (2) new regional employers will need to tap
city markets to fill their work force; (3) failure to address inner-city
social problems will come back to haunt all taxpayers in the form of
higher costs for prisons and welfare; (4) inner-city crime affects the
image of the entire region; (5) environmental issues can only be
addressed regionwide; and (6) regional cooperation will bring enhanced
82. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 25, at 18-20; Cashin, supra note 5, at 2000-01. Several
empirical studies support those claims. See, e.g., Joseph Persky & Wim Wiewel, The Distribution of
Costs and Benefits Due to Employment Deconcentration, in URBAN-SUBURBAN
INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 5, at 67 (concluding that expansion of suburban manufacturing
employment opportunities imposes substantial costs on inner city residents and represents a "subsidy
from low- and moderate-income black and Hispanic residents of the city and inner suburbs to
stockholders elsewhere in the nation"); Richard Voith, The Determinants of Metropolitan
Development Patterns: What are the Roles of Preferences, Prices and Public Choices, in URBAN-
SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 5, at 50, 78 (study of recent transportation investments
in the Philadelphia area shows that cities subsidize suburban transit development, leading to
inefficient suburbanization, diminished opportunities for central city, and a clear causal link between
city and suburban dependency).
83. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 2, at 1166.
84. A recent book by Kathryn A. Foster on special districts concludes, somewhat surprisingly
perhaps, that services provided by regional single purpose government units are actually more
expensive than having the general purpose government provide the same service. Foster, supra note
24, at 148-88. Foster speculates that the higher cost is due to "inflationary influence of political
isolation, functional specialization, and administrative and financial flexibility," id. at 174-76. She
recognizes, however, that the higher cost may merely reflect the fact that regional special districts
provide a higher quality of service. See id. at 184.
85. See PEIRCE, supra note 9, at 131.
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political clout.8 6 In addition, the economic well-being of the suburbs
appears to correlate significantly with the prosperity of their central
cities. Stated simply, the claim is that healthier metropolitan regions
contain more prosperous central cities. In fact, in the twenty-five
metropolitan areas with the most rapid income growth, central city
incomes also increased."8 Conversely, as the gap between central city and
suburban prosperity widens, the overall absolute level of suburban
wealth tends to be lower: in the eighteen metropolitan areas that recently
experienced declines in income, central city income also decreased in all
but four instances."' Thus, the reduction of socio-economic disparities in
metropolitan regions can be justified as a matter of favored quarter self-
interest, rather than exclusively dependent on municipal selflessness and
charitable intent. If in fact the fate of the region depends on the health of
the central city, redistribution from favored quarter to urban core is
imperative.
Third, the New Regionalism rejects the localist claim that ideals of
democratic participation militate against metropolitan area government
reform. Recognizing that localists have long used the preservation of
responsive, accountable units of government as an argument against
regionalization,' some New Regionalists argue that, in fact, a regionally
bounded multi-purpose government would better promote those
86. See id. at 131-32. Anthony Downs identifies similarly vital functions served by cities in
metropolitan areas. See DOwNS, supra note 1, at 52-59.
87. See LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R. BARNES, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, "ALL IN IT
TOGETHER": CITIES, SUBURBS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC REGIONS (1993). In that study, the authors
found that in the 25 metropolitan areas with the most rapid income growth, central city incomes also
increased. Id. at 6. Conversely, in the 18 metropolitan areas that recently experienced income
decline, central city income declined in all but four instances. 1d. On this basis, the authors asserted
that "the economic fate and fortune of cities and suburbs are inextricably intertwined." Id. at 4. Other
analyses have reached similar conclusions about the interdependence of suburb and city. See, e.g.,
Persky & Wiewel, supra note 82; Richard Voith, Central City Decline: Regional or Neighborhood
Solutions, BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 3; H.V. Savitch et. al, Ties that Bind: Central Cities,
Suburbs, and the New Metropolitan Region, 7 ECON. DEV. QUARTERLY 341 (1993); Richard Voith,
City and Suburban Growth: Substitutes or Complements, BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 21
(concluding that an economically vital central city is essential to the health of the metropolitan area).
88. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 87, at 6. Whether the relationship is one of
causation or merely of correlation remains subject to dispute. Compare the sources cited supra notes
82, 87, with Gottlieb, supra note 9, at 21 (arguing that empirical studies demonstrate that the causal
link between central city-suburb complementarily is debatable, at best); Harrison, supra note 75, at
141 (concluding that the relationship between suburban and central city health is correlative, not
causative); Gillette, supra note 18, at 242; Briffault, supra note 25, at 27 (noting the
inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence on economic interdependence of city and suburb).
89. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 87, at 6.
90. See supra notes 48-50, and accompanying text.
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longstanding democratic ideals.9 In that view, the existing ability of
many local governments to take actions whose impacts extend far
beyond their borders underscores the fundamentally anti-democratic
disparity between local governments' physical territory and the scope of
their powers in U.S. metropolitan regions.
Equity, the fourth criterion advanced by many New Regionalists, is
rooted in the assertion that the current economic schism between city and
affluent suburb is fundamentally unfair. In this view, local government
boundaries enhance the preservation of privilege and prevent the
redistribution of wealth in metropolitan areas. Though the norms of
efficiency, economic interdependence, and democratic participation can
be debated with economic and statistical analyses, equity stands alone
with its roots in moral convictions about fairness and justice. It starts
with a recognition of the fact that suburbanization and the central city
decline that accompanied it were the results of government policies that
transferred large amounts of public resources from city to suburb.
Metropolitan highway systems, government funding of commuter rail
systems, education spending, government mortgage financing, and the
privileged tax status of real property tax payments92 represent huge
public subsidies of the suburbs at the expense of the cities.93 But the
strength of the equity norm does not depend on empirical corroboration.
More simply, it is rooted in the conviction that regional redistribution of
wealth is "the right thing to do."9
91. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 2, at 1164-70; Cashin, supra note 5, at 2035-47.
92. Because local property tax payments are deductible for federal income tax purposes, and
because local school funding relies heavily on the property tax, the deductibility provides a huge
indirect federal subsidy to schools. As Richard Rothstein explained: "A family in the 28% bracket
that pays $1000 in local property taxes for public schools can deduct that payment on its income tax
returns, reducing its income tax bill by $280. Of the $1000 going to schools, the family pays only
$720 out of its earnings. The federal government contributes the $280 balance." See Richard
Rothstein, How the U.S. Tax Code Worsens the Education Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at Al 7.
A Stanford University economist theorizes that this federal subsidy makes families more willing to
pay higher taxes for better schools. Id.
93. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 5, at 2003-14 (citing various examples where the "favored
quarter" receives a disproportionate share of public infrastructure funds for roads, highways,
expensive sanitary sewage treatment systems); DUANY ET AL., supra note 5, at 8-15; Richard Voith,
The Determinants of Metropolitan Development Patterns: What are the roles of Preferences. Prices,
and Public Choices, in URBAN-SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 5, at 78-80 (claiming
that in the case of Philadelphia and possibly other cities, the central city subsidized public transit for
suburbanites); ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS, supra note 10, at 71 (noting that in the fee structure of
regional sewage disposal, Minneapolis and St. Paul pay $6 million more in fees than they incur in
costs).
94. In the words of one urban economist who recently concluded that the regionalists' economic
interdependency argument is at best subject to empirical dispute:
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2. New Regionalism in the Legal Literature
Although New Regionalism is fairly new to the legal literature and the
incidents of self-identification are rare, some of the academic
commentary has begun to use the term. Professor Sheryll Cashin's recent
article described the movement in the following terms: "[The New
Regionalism] attempts to bridge metropolitan social and fiscal inequities
with regional governance structures, or fora for robust regional
cooperation, that do not completely supplant local governments."95
Irrespective of the label used, the current work of both localists and
regionalists can fairly be said to come under the wide doctrinal umbrella
of the New Regionalism. Public choice theorists, for instance, temper
their enthusiasm for the asserted efficiency benefits of a fragmented
metropolitan region, proposing voluntary cooperation among and
between units, and suggesting that wealthier local governments will
recognize that their own welfare is maximized by a regionwide sharing
of burdens.96 In addition, those who evaluate local government structures
from the public choice perspective applaud the use of regional
governance efforts for the provision of regionwide services, especially
those that require large investments in capital infrastructure.97 Similarly,
New Regionalism's tenets appear to have. appealed to such staunch
localists such as Professor Frug, who recognizes that local autonomy
produces unacceptable negative impacts in a metropolitan region and
proposes ways in which a regionwide entity could produce a more
equitable distribution of burdens.9" Though still fundamentally opposed
Why is it that programs to help our neighbors pull themselves out of poverty must be justified in
terms of the economic self-interest of those who provide the cash? We worry that by
contributing to this literature, we have changed the terms of the debate to a positivist realm in
which, if the numbers don't come out right, metropolitan anti-poverty programs will have been
proven to be a 'bad idea.' But a number of us believe that antipoverty programs are always a
good idea, simply because they are the right thing to do.
Gottlieb, supra note 9, at 43. See also DOWNS, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing the affluent quarter's
moral responsibility to central city).
95. See Cashin, supra note 5, at 2027, 2033-34. For other references and descriptions of the New
Regionalism, see also, Frank S. Alexander, Inherent Tensions Between Home Rule and Regional
Planning, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539, 540 (2000); John Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in
Metropolitan Areas: Voter Resistance and Reform Persistence, 13 PACE L. REV. 449, 474-75
(1993).
96. See, e.g., Parks & Oakerson, supra note 27, at 169; Gillette, supra note 18, at 190, 241-45.
See also infra notes 206-219 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Parks & Oakerson, supra note 27, at 170-72.
98. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING, BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 85-89, 106-09 (outlining a proposal for regional government); Ford, supra note 17, at 1183-
90. Their proposals involve making territorial borders more permeable and reflective of the fact that
Washington Law Review
to wide-scale consolidation of metropolitan area governments, both Frug
and the public choice scholars admit the need for some regional entities
or agreements. And finally, Richard Briffault's critique of localism
anticipated the New Regionalism's acceptance, indeed support, of local
autonomy. Briffault's pragmatic assessment of the likely failure of
general purpose regional governments, coupled with his endorsement of
regional legislatures with well defined powers, would leave untouched
the large number of pre-existing autonomous local government units in
metropolitan areas.99 Localist and regionalist doctrine alike, thus, enter
the 21st century tempered with a recognition that local government law
and theory must take into account both the reality of metropolitan
regions and the interconnectedness among units of government, as well
as the stubborn permanence of those units of local government.
Notwithstanding the emerging consensus on the importance of the
region in metropolitan areas, it would be foolish to claim that localists
and regionalists have put aside their differences and found salvation in
the New Regionalism.10 Rather, the allure of the New Regionalism may
be simply that it holds something for everybody, that its wide ranging
normative concerns and diversity of proposals allow all who study urban
development to find something in the New Regionalist agenda to
support. Those who emphasize economic efficiency arguments are likely
to champion voluntary cooperation to produce supra-municipal service
providers. In contrast, those who stress the economic interdependence
norm are likely to support regionalist proposals that rely on enlightened
suburban self-interest to cure metropolitan area inequality. The
participation localists, who place primary importance on the role of small
local governments are not self-contained atomistic entities but rather part of a larger region. See
Ford, supra note 17, at 1188-89. The authors also suggest that a regional legislature with limited
negotiation powers would assist regions in working toward these goals. See Frug, supra, at 106.
Their ideas capture the reality that metropolitan area citizens may live in one local government, work
in another, and have numerous contacts with many other local governments. See id.; see also Ford,
supra note 17, at 1188-89. The cross border voting proposal would allow citizens of the region to
cast their vote in the unit of government that they identify with the most. See id. More recently,
Professor Frug has suggested that local government law scholars might learn from the experience of
the European Union in the formation of its regional entities. See Frug, Beyond Regional
Government, supra note 15.
99. Briffault, supra note 29, at 453-54.
100. In fact, a comparison of the localist approaches to the New Regionalism reveals major
differences in the ways in which scholars support regionalization. While public choice advocates
such as Professor Gillette seem to endorse only those regionalist efforts that preserve local
autonomy, see Gillette, supra note 18, at 197-210, Professor Frug and the participation theorists
advocate a real infusion of regional values into local decisionmaking, see Gerald E. Frug, Against
Centralization, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 31, 36-37 (2000) and Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60
U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 271-312 (1993).
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governmental units in the preservation of democracy, will undoubtedly
favor those regionalist proposals that tinker the least with local
autonomy. And finally, those who come to regionalism with an eye
toward ensuring a closer tie between government's territory and the
scope of the impact of its actions are likely to defend regionalism
reforms that entail the establishment of new, regional government
bodies.'0 '
II. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN
METROPOLITAN AREAS
The preceding description of New Regionalists' emerging shared
articulation of policy goals for metropolitan areas lays the background
for this Part, which begins with a brief overview of the legal structural
framework within which intergovernmental cooperation is established
and operates. It then describes and evaluates the major types of
intergovernmental cooperation techniques available in metropolitan
areas. Finally, this Part reviews the New Regionalism's analysis of
intergovernmental cooperation and notes the incomplete and/or
inaccurate assumptions on which it is based. It concludes by arguing that
that these voluntary efforts are actually unlikely to promote, and may in
fact work counter to, many of the New Regionalism's goals.
A. Types of Intergovernmental Cooperation Efforts
All intergovernmental cooperative efforts operate against a backdrop
of state enabling authority. The possible sources of authority are wide-
ranging, and may include a state constitutional provision,0 2 municipal
home rule powers,0 3 a general state statute enabling intergovernmental
101. As the preeminent proponent of regionalism in local government law, Richard Briffault
recently summarized the normative defense of a redistribution of government power in metropolitan
areas: "in contemporary metropolitan areas, the economically, socially, and ecologically relevant
local area is often the region. Consequently, in metropolitan areas, concerns about efficiency,
democracy, and community ought to lead to support for some shift in power away from existing
localities to new processes, structures, or organizations that can promote decision-making on behalf
of the interests of a region considered as a whole. Regionalism is, thus, localism for metropolitan
areas." Briffault, supra note 25, at 2.
102. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. 8, § 4.
103. See Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208, 212-13 (Mo. 1986)
(en banc) (upholding intergovernmental agreement as a valid exercise of home rule power without
independent statutory authorization).
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cooperation," 4 or a specific enabling act for a particular type of
intergovernmental action."' In some cases, independent statutory
restrictions," 6 the primacy of other provisions of state law,"0 7 or the
interaction between different intergovernmental cooperation statutes 08
104. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-20-101-104 (Michie 2002); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 220/3
(1996); IOWA CODE § 28E (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.010 (2000); WIS. STAT. § 66.031
(1999).
105. See, e.g., OH. REV. CODE. § 308 (West 1998) (law detailing formation of a regional airport
authority); WASH. REV. CODE 54.16.200 (1989) (Washington law regulating the formation of public
utility districts); WIS. STAT. § 200.13 (2002) (detailing formation of metropolitan sewerage districts).
106. See, e.g., City of Hamilton v. Public Water Supply Dist., 849 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993). In this case, the city's contract to supply water to a public water district stated that no capital
costs would figure into the rates charged by the city. When the city undertook to raise rates to cover
the cost of repaying bonds for capital improvements, the water district filed suit to block the rate
increase. The appellate court upheld the city's power to ignore the contract limitation, noting that a
state statute required the city to set rates at a level high enough to recoup the costs of financing the
bonds. See id. at 101. See also Jefferson v. Mo. Dep't of Natural Res., 863 S.W.2d 844, 849-50 (Mo.
1993) (local government must follow statute authorizing creation of intergovernmental solid waste
management districts and cannot rely on state constitutional provision for intergovernmental
cooperation); Info. Techs., Inc. v. St. Louis County, 14 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(application of state statutory requirements on bidding for public contracts depended on whether
intergovernmental contract involved governmental function).
107. A contract for services, though adhering to statutory requirements on intergovernmental
cooperation, may be invalidated for noncompliance with other statutory directives. See e.g., W.
Wash. Univ. v. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees, 58 Wash. App. 433, 440, 793 P.2d 989, 992 (1990)
(invalidating university contract with city for the provision of police services because of overriding
statutory mandate that disbanding of university police department must adhere to labor rules
regarding layoffs and interpretation of university police collective bargaining agreement). See also
Elk Grove Township Rural Fire Prot. Dist. v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 592 N.E.2d 549, 552 (111.
App. Ct. 1992) (intergovernmental agreement involving promise to execute future tax levies
invalidated by general principles of Illinois law; agreement improperly "denies prospective
administrations and taxpayers any input into future levies... [and] is therefore void ab initio"); City
of New Smyrna Beach v. County of Volusia, 518 So.2d 1379, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(Florida constitutional requirement for a dual referendum to uphold intergovernmental transfer of
"function and power relating to services" not applicable to intergovernmental transfer of regulatory
powers). Compare, e.g., Farlouis v. LaRock, 315 So.2d 50, 56 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (state bidding
requirements not applicable to industrial district created by municipality), with Smith v.
Intergovernmental Solid Waste Disposal Ass'n, 605 N.E.2d 654, 663 (11 App. Ct. 1992) (statutory
requirements for competitive bidding applies to regional special district).
108. In State v. Plaggemeier, 93 Wash. App. 472, 474-75, 969 P.2d 519, 521 (1999), five local
governments entered a mutual aid agreement for the purpose of reducing drunk driving in their area.
Two state enabling statutes were relevant to the scope of the agreement. First, under Washington's
Mutual Aid Act, a local sheriff or chief of police can give consent to mutual aid agreements with
neighboring municipalities, see WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070 (2002). Under Washington's
Interlocal Cooperation Act, WASH. REv. CODE § 39.34 (2000), however, all intergovernmental
cooperative efforts require ratification by the governing legislative bodies. In its decision to uphold
an arrest made pursuant to a Mutual Aid Agreement that had not been ratified by the participants'
legislative bodies, the court invalidated all other aspects of the agreement, which included the
establishment of an interjurisdictional task force. Plaggemeier, 93 Wash. App. at 476-81, 969 P.2d
at 522-25. Though the court stressed that the Mutual Aid Act was not an independent source of
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may limit local governmental flexibility. Moreover, general state
constitutional limits on government power, such as the anti-delegation
doctrine,"0 9 the prohibition of special commissions,"0 the prohibition of
special legislation,"' restrictions on government subscription of stock,"'
public purpose requirements,"1 debt limitations,"4 and the general state
requirement that local governments not contract away their police
enabling authority for Washington police departments, it is difficult to see how the extraterritorial
arrest provision, which did not comply with the Interlocal Cooperation Act, can be upheld on any
other basis.
109. See Vt. Dep't of Pub. Serv. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 215, 219-23 (Vt.
1988) (notwithstanding state statute authorizing municipal electrical utility to enter
intergovernmental contracts for the purchase of power, utility's agreement to transfer all
decisionmaking power to joint utility agency invalidated as prohibited attempt to delegate
governmental authority; and stating "any contract whereby legislative authority or duty is attempted
to be delegated by a city is absolutely null and void"); Bames v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.,
341 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Iowa 1983) (delegation doctrine invalidates city attempt to transfer approval
power over siting of low income housing to regional housing authority created pursuant to state
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act); County of Racine v. City of Oak Creek, 477 N.W.2d 318, 320
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (stating county duty to guard prisoners cannot be transferred to city pursuant to
intergovernmental contract; state statutes create non-delegable duty). But see, e.g., Local 22, Phila.
Fire Fighters' Union v. Commonwealth, 613 A.2d 522, 526 (Pa. 1992) (rejecting delegation
challenge to formation of joint financial services authority); Goreham v. Des Moines Metro. Area
Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa. 1970) (same); Vill. of Sherman v. Vill. of
Williamsville, 435 N.E.2d 548, 552 (I11. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting delegation challenge to an
intergovernmental contract for services); Clayton v. Vill. of Oak Park, 453 N.E.2d 937, 945 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1983) (court rejects delegation challenge to establishment of village agency). Professor
Gillette's recent analysis of intergovernmental actions examined the nondelegation doctrine and
concluded that, though it may properly restrict local government ability to act, it imposes significant
costs on formal interlocal contracts. See Gillette, supra note 18, at 219-31.
110. See, e.g., Specht v. City of Sioux Falls, 526 N.W.2d 727, 731 (S.D. 1995) (invalidating
regional authority as unconstitutional special commission); but see Local 22 Phila. Fire Fighters'
Union, 613 A.2d at 526 (rejecting special commission challenge).
11l. See, e.g., City of Rye v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 249 N.E.2d 429, 431 (N.Y. 1969) (statute
creating authority did not constitute prohibited special legislation).
112. See Pease v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 550 P.2d 565, 567-58 (Okla. 1976) (holding that
intergovernmental entity did not run afoul of constitutional prohibition on government subscription
of stock).
113. See, e.g., Mulkey v. Quillian, 100 S.E.2d 268, 270-71 (Ga. 1957) (intergovernmental
contract involving state loan to political subdivision of state violates state constitutional requirement
that tax revenues be spent for a public purpose).
114. See, e.g., Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 338 S.E.2d 240, 243 (Ga. 1986) (holding
intergovernmental contracts clause of state constitution limited by separate constitutional provision
requiring voter consent to city decision to incur debt pursuant to intergovernmental agreement). But
compare with Ambac Indem. Corp. v. Akridge, 425 S.E.2d 637, 640 (Ga. 1993) (county's contract
for services with regional special district, which involved issuance of revenue bonds for financing of
waste disposal system, did not constitute debt in violation of state constitution).
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power, 5 may reduce the breath of state enabling authority. In addition,
states disagree on whether both entities in an intergovernmental
agreement must independently have the power to engage in the activity
that is subject to the agreement, or whether it is sufficient for one unit to
be enabled. Known as the debate between the "mutuality of powers"
'' 16
approach and the "power of one unit""'  approach, the principle also has
a substantial impact on the breadth of potential intergovernmental
cooperative efforts. Within those general parameters, however, local
discretion is quite broad.
According to the categorization adopted by the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations"' intergovernmental cooperative efforts
115. See, e.g., City of Hamilton v. Pub. Water Supply Dist. #2 of Caldwell County, 849 S.W.2d
96, 103-04 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (invalidating intergovernmental contract provision in which city
improperly agreed to limit its rate); Elk Grove Township Rural Fire Prot. Dist. v. Vill. of Mount
Prospect, 592 N.E.2d 549, 522 (fI1. App. Ct. 1992) (contracting governmental unit cannot bind itself
to future tax levies); Cibolo Creek Mun. Auth. v. City of Universal City, 568 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1978) (stating in dicta that an intergovernmental contract cannot limit regional district's
right to charge connection fees to its system).
116. Under the "mutuality of powers" approach to intergovernmental cooperation, governments
can only contract with each other for services if each governmental unit has independent authority to
engage in the subject of the contract on its own. See, e.g., United Water Res., Inc. v. N. Jersey Dist.
Water Supply Comm'n, 685 A.2d 24, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (concluding that
intergovernmental cooperation act "was not intended as a vehicle to enhance the enumerated powers
granted to local units"); Durango Transp., Inc. v. City of Durango, 824 P.2d 48, 49 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991) (applying COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 18(2)(a), which authorizes intergovernmental cooperation
and contracts to provide any function, service, or facility lawfully authorized to each of the
cooperating or contracting units). The issue is not always as straightforward as it might appear. The
Washington Interlocal Cooperation Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34 (2000), for instance, clearly
articulates a mutuality of powers standard. When the city of Spokane created a public facilities
district for the purpose of financing and building a new public arena jointly with the county, it
proceeded to condemn private property for the district to use as the arena site. The landowners
challenged the condemnation, arguing that, because the district has no powers of condemnation, the
interlocal cooperation act prohibited the city's actions. The court upheld the city's actions, saying
that the its role as a "partner" and not as an "agent" in the agreement meant that the mutuality
provision did not prohibit the condemnation. See Schreiner v. City of Spokane, 74 Wash. App. 617,
624, 874 P.2d 883, 888 (1994).
117. Under the "power of one unit" approach, so long as one of the contracting governments has
the power to undertake the activity, an intergovernmental contract will be upheld. The result is an
increase in governmental power. See, e.g., County of Wabash v. Partee, 608 N.E.2d 674, 679 (I11.
App. Ct. 1993) ("The very purpose of [the Intergovernmental Cooperation provision of the Illinois
Constitution] is to allow a local government to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly, as long
as it is otherwise lawful."). For a comparison of the two approaches to intergovernmental
cooperation, see ACIR, supra note 22, at 9; VALENTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 407-14.
118. A survey of these state statutes on intergovernmental cooperation, conducted by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, concluded that intergovernmental
cooperation efforts are widely used and suggested a three part categorization that describes the most
prevalent types of intergovernmental cooperative efforts: contracts for services; joint provision of
services; and the creation of a new governmental entity. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
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can be characterized as contracts for services; joint provisions of
services; and the creation of a new unit of government." 9 In addition,
Professor Clayton Gillette has recently described a fourth type of
intergovernmental cooperation, which he refers to as "voluntary burden
sharing."' 0 The following analysis will consider whether any of these
efforts constitute a realistic mechanism for reducing regional disparities.
It will suggest that the New Regionalism's generally positive
assessments of intergovernmental cooperation are flawed. The
availability of voluntary regionwide cooperative efforts may improperly
remove an incentive to meaningful regional burden sharing and may
facilitate the ongoing off-loading of metropolitan burdens onto the less
affluent segments of metropolitan areas. In fact, by allowing independent
local governments to participate in metropolitan governance only when it
benefits their own short-term interests, intergovernmental cooperation
may exacerbate the metropolitan regional inequality that the New
Regionalism seeks to eliminate.
1. Contracts for Services
Pursuant to statutes or state constitutional provisions, local
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 327 (1982).
Another publication by the same group concluded that in 1983, more than half of U.S. municipalities
and counties had cooperative units with other units of government. See ACIR, supra note 20, at 25.
The ACIR was abruptly terminated by Congress in its 1996 budget, in which it allocated funds for
the "prompt and orderly termination of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations."
PUB. L. NO. 104-52, tit. IV, 109 STAT. 468, 480. See Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental
Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism ": Devolution, Revolution or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV.
97, 104 (1996) for a description of how the ACIR was originally created.
119. As in the case in any attempted typology of local government laws, these categories are not
completely insular and discrete. Consider, for instance, the intergovernmental arrangement described
by the court in Glassy Creek Neighborhood Alliance v. City of Winston-Salem, 542 S.E.2d 296, 298
(N.C. Ct. App. 2001). In that case, the city and county consolidated their water and sewer systems,
and created a joint Utility Commission to operate it. Though in some ways the resulting entity falls
into the special district category, in other important ways it operated much like a joint services
agreement. Id. at 298. Though the commission exercised a fair amount of independence and
autonomous discretion, the oversight of both participating general purpose units was substantial. Id.
See also City of Oakland v. Williams, 103 P.2d 168, 169 (Cal. 1940) (contract transferring to one of
seven municipal signatories the power to create a binding plan for joint waste disposal). Thus,
although the categories described by the ACIR are helpful for purposes of general analysis and
illustration, the enormous variety of possible intergovernmental cooperative efforts defies simple
categorization.
120. See Gillette, supra note 18, at 194, in which Professor Gillette defines voluntary burden
sharing as "interlocal agreements to alleviate socio-economic disparities within a region." For an
evaluation of his proposal, see infra notes 206-220 and accompanying text.
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governments in most states are empowered to contract with another
local government to receive services provided by one of the contracting
units. 122 Presumably, two general purpose local government entities, such
as municipalities or counties, will not enter into a contract for services
unless the receiving entity can buy the service at a price that is lower
than what it would have to spend to produce and provide the service
itself. At the same time, the providing entity is unlikely to contract to
provide the service unless it derives a benefit as well, for instance, by
being able to exploit excess capacity that would otherwise go unused, by
being able to price the service at a level that allows it to derive a profit,
or by enhancing the welfare of its own citizens by providing the service
on a larger scale.
Consider, for instance, the facts of Durango Transportation, Inc. v.
City of Durango.'23 In that case, a city-county agreement required the
city to extend its municipally owned and operated bus service outside of
the city but within the county's territorial limits. Questioning the legality
of the intergovernmental contract, a private company sued to stop the
municipal service provider from encroaching on its own service territory
within the county. Under the terms of that intergovernmental contract, a
Transit Advisory Board was established to provide advice and
recommendations to the city, which had the ultimate decisionmaking
power. The Board, in turn, was comprised of individuals appointed by
both the city and the county. The county had no "financial or
121. According to an ACIR study undertaken several decades go, virtually all states authorize
intergovernmental cooperation, either by constitutional provision, statutory enabling acts, or both.
See ACIR, supra note 20, at 91.
122. This 'Section will focus on services provided pursuant to intergovernmental contracts
between general purpose local governments. It is worth noting that these intergovernmental contracts
may deal with either ongoing services (as is the more common case discussed in the text) or for the
provision of a particular capital improvement, see, e.g., Skybort Props. of Or. v. Multnomah County
Drainage Dist., 844 P.2d 909, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (culverts) and Beckwith v. County of
Stanislaus, 345 P.2d 363, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (bridges). Although local governments frequently
contract with private service providers, those contracts for services are beyond the scope of this
Article. Contracts for services involving a regional special district are considered at text
accompanying notes 174-205, infra. Closely related to intergovernmental contracts for services, and
with potential impact on regional well-being are intergovernmental boundary agreements. Under
those intergovernmental contracts, two or more governmental units pledge to respect the others'
annexation authority in territory as allocated under the agreement. In Village of Long Grove v.
Village of Kildeer, 497 N.E.2d 319, 321 (i1. App. Ct. 1986), the court held that boundary
agreements are not included within the scope of Illinois' Intergovernmental Cooperation Act.
Subsequently, the Illinois legislature specifically authorized the execution of intergovernmental
boundary agreements. See Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 574 N.E.2d 1316, 1320 (I11. App. Ct.
1991). This Article will not analyze this type of intergovernmental contract.
123. 824 P.2d 48 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
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management participation"'24 nor did it assume any "potential liability"
from the operation of the bus system.'25 Although the Durango court
upheld the legality of the intergovernmental contract, it did not discuss
the underlying motivation for its formation. A wide range of
explanations is plausible. It is possible, for instance, that the expanded
service would not require the purchase of additional buses, or that the
city could price the county service at a level that would produce a profit
for city revenues, or that the enhanced service territory met the demand
of city citizens for county-wide public transportation. On the other side
of the bargain, the county may not have had the financial capability nor
the political will to establish its own transportation service. In any event,
its transfer of power to the city and its own limited involvement suggests
that the county was confident in the city's ability to protect the welfare of
county residents.
A survey by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations identified several local disincentives to intergovernmental
contracts for services. For one thing, the receiving unit is likely to be
wary of the potential loss of local autonomy and control that results from
the relinquishment of its authority over the service production and
provision.'26 The other major disincentive, according to the survey, is
that local governments fear that their contracting partners will not
apportion costs equitably.'27 Notwithstanding these perceived drawbacks,
intergovernmental contracts for services are widely used across the
country. The question remains, however, whether they enhance or
decrease the general regional welfare.
Intergovernmental contracts for services would seem to provide an
opportunity for maximized efficiency and overall enhancement of service
delivery. In his important study of municipal incorporation in Los
Angeles County, however, Gary Miller analyzed a series of
intergovernmental contracts for services that had the opposite effect. 2
8
Known as the Lakewood Plan in honor of the first community to use an
intergovernmental contract to avoid annexation by larger cities in the
county, Los Angeles County became the provider of many services to
newly incorporated municipalities. Citizens living in the unincorporated
areas of Los Angeles County had three options-to remain in
unincorporated county territory, which typically meant no local control
124. Id. at 53.
125. Id.
126. See ACIR, supra note 20, at 39-40.
127. Id. at 40.
128. See MILLER, supra note 39.
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over services or land use; to be annexed by the existing cities; or to
incorporate as separate municipalities. 129 Before the Lakewood Plan, the
costs of incorporation were substantial, requiring the new municipality to
establish departments to provide police, fire, and other basic urban
services. However, Los Angeles County, was willing to contract with
newly incorporated municipalities to continue providing the services
these communities had received from the county prior to their
incorporation."30 With the problem of providing municipal services
solved, and with the attractive opportunity to form communities whose
property tax revenues would now be kept largely within the community
rather than redistributed throughout the county, numerous incorporations
occurred, typically of wealthy, homogeneous residential areas. In fact,
not only did the Lakewood Plan stop the redistribution of revenues that
had occurred prior to incorporation, Miller's analysis showed that in fact
the county priced the services at such a low level that non-Lakewood
Plan parts of the county were providing a substantial subsidy to the
Lakewood Plan communities. 31
129. See id. at21.
130. See id. at 10-22.
131. Miller claims that the county charged Lakewood Plan cities an artificially low rate and then
spread the total cost across the entire county. See id. at 22-26. To some extent, this phenomenon
occurs naturally in most U.S. counties, because of the ways in which counties service two distinct
populations. First, they provide county-wide services, such as the judicial system, to all county
residents. In addition, they serve as the general service provider to the unincorporated areas of the
county. If the county tax rate is equal for all county residents, city residents, who do not receive
many county services, subsidize county residents. In the Lakewood Plan, this subsidization extended
to contract cities, for which the price of services was typically set at pre-incorporation levels. In fact,
a private study suggested that the subsidization of contract cities exceeded $5 million a year for
police services alone. Id. at 24. Miller suggests that the county was in fact eager to set its prices at
this low rate to cement its position as the dominant service provider and to guarantee the
preservation of a large bureaucracy. See id. at 22-23. The real losers, of course, were the cities in
Lakewood County that provide their own services while paying taxes to the county. Because county
officials are elected by all county voters, it may well be that the non-Lakewood Plan cities did not
have a strong enough political voice to end the subsidy. Of course, the county may have had other,
more benign, reasons to set the contract price so low. For one thing, the county may have doubted its
continued ability to serve its own residents if its territorial base were to lose the population of the
newly incorporated areas. That loss might have brought the county's service base beneath the critical
mass necessary to provide services on an efficient level. As a result, the county may have concluded
that it was ultimately to the benefit of its citizens in the unincorporated area to provide service to
nonresidents, even when the contract price imposed a loss on the provider.
The Supreme Court of Iowa appears to have prohibited a "Lakewood-like" arrangement proposed
by a group of citizens seeking to incorporate in Citizens of Rising Sun v. Rising Sun City
Development Commision, 528 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1995). In that case, the proponents of
incorporation asserted that the newly incorporated entity would contract with all pre-existing service
providers to obtain all required municipal services. In its affirmance of the denial of the
incorporation petition, the court concluded that petitioners had not met their statutory burden of
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Rather than the win-win situation hypothesized earlier for
intergovernmental contracts for services such as the one described in
Durango, the Lakewood Plan suggests that not all contracts may be so
benign. The Lakewood Plan allowed wealthy enclaves to incorporate
without having to face the costs associated with producing services for
their constituents.'32 At the same time, the act of municipal incorporation
allowed them to capture their high property value for their own
municipal taxation purposes, while artificially reducing the costs they
would incur to provide the services their residents demanded. Though the
Lakewood Plan communities were undoubtedly better off because of the
high tax revenues and decreased service needs that resulted from their
incorporation, not all segments of the area were so fortunate. In fact, the
county suffered the loss of substantial tax revenues and lost money in the
provision of the contract for services, while cities in the county were
deprived of the opportunity to annex the highly valued properties.'33
A second potential weakness of intergovernmental contracts for
services is the reduction of the legal oversight and potential for legal
redress that might otherwise be available to regulate government
provision of services. Normally, when a local government provides
services to individuals living outside its territorial borders, a range of
judicial doctrines and statutory limits apply to regulate the provider's
relationship with the service recipient. Rates are frequently required to be
"reasonable and uniform,"''  and courts may invalidate what they
perceive as municipal attempts to gouge nonresident recipients of
municipal services.' 35 When the nonresidents receive service pursuant to
intergovernmental contract, however, these limitations do not apply,'36
perhaps because of the assumed equal bargaining position of the two
contracting units of local government. Similarly, although a municipality
has no general duty to provide services to nonresidents, it may have such
showing that an incorporating entity has the ability "to provide customary municipal services." Id. at
602.
132. See id. at 20-22.
133. See id. at 100.
134. See, e.g., Township of Aston v. S.W. Del. County Mun. Auth., 535 A.2d 725, 728 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1985) (quoting state requirements that a municipality's water rates for individual
nonresident customers must be "reasonable and uniform"); Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949 P.2d 325,
311 (Utah 1997) (ruling town may charge nonresidents a higher rate, but there must be a reasonable
basis for difference--court also notes that reasonableness standard applies to city's provision of
services to its residents as well).
135. See City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 246 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. 1952).
136. See Township of Aston, 535 A.2d at 728; Township of Raccoon v. Mun. Water Auth. of the
Borough of Aliquippa, 597 A.2d 757, 762 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1991).
Washington Law Review
a duty in particular instances. Under the "holding out" doctrine, courts
have determined that when a municipality agrees to provide a particular
service to nonresidents, it will have impliedly assumed a duty to provide
service to all similarly situated nonresidents.'37 The holding out
exception also appears inapplicable to intergovernmental contracts that
establish exclusive service territories or condition nonresident receipt of
municipal service on annexation to the providing municipality.
13 8
In addition, under the law of many states, municipal service providers
are exempt from the regulatory regime that would apply to private
providers of utilities and transportation services. This exemption often
extends to a municipality's provision of services to nonresidents pursuant
to an intergovernmental contract for services.'39 It is true that lawsuits
brought by frustrated private sector competitors who seek to provide the
same services may provide some check against governmental abuse in
this context. 40 If the rationale for the lack of regulatory oversight over
municipal utilities is that the political process operates to ensure the fair
treatment of citizens, however, it is not immediately obvious how the
intergovernmental nature of the contract removes the need for regulatory
oversight of a government's agreement to provide services to
nonresidents.
And finally, to the extent that Professor Frug's critique of localism
offers a persuasive rearticulation of the role of local governments as
community builders,'4 ' any decision by a local government to divest
137. For brief descriptions of the holding out exception to the rule that municipal governments
have no duty to extend services to non-residents, see, e.g., Town of Rocky Mount v. Wenco of
Danville, 506 S.E.2d 17, 20-21 (Va. 1999) and Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp.
260, 264 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
138. See, e.g., Allen's Creek Properties, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 679 So.2d 1172, 1176 (Fla.
1996); Haik v. Town of Alta, 176 F.3d 488, 1999 WL 190717 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
139. See City of Durango v. Durango Transp. Inc., 807 P.2d 1152, 1160 (Colo. 1991) (Public
Utilities Commission has no jurisdiction over municipally owned bus service providing
extraterritorial service pursuant to intergovernmental contract). Contra Texas Water Comm'n v. City
of Fort Worth, 875 S.W.2d 332, 355 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that state commission has
jurisdiction to review rates charged by city to another city pursuant to intergovernmental contract for
sewer services, notwithstanding a provision in state Interlocal Cooperation Act that the power to
enter an intergovernmental contract "prevails over a limitation in any other law," TEX. GOv'T CODE
ANN. § 791.026 (Vernon 1994)).
140. See, e.g., Durango Transp. Inc., 807 P.2d at 1152; Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Servs. Co. v. City
of Inglewood, 948 P.2d 943, 949-51 (Cal. 1998) (rejecting the challenge of a company that bid on
city contract for the processing of parking tickets to the city's decision to award the contract to
another municipality).
141. For a full development of the argument that cities should focus on the development of strong
personal ties between citizens and government and among citizens generally, see Frug, supra note
34, at 1081-1107 (1996).
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itself of control over the provision of services only contributes to the
government's own further disempowerment and increasing irrelevancy in
the eyes of its citizens. 42 Though Frug was referring specifically to the
way in which special districts exercise power over city services and
residents, syphoning off what would otherwise be important municipal
functions, his critique applies equally to the self-inflicted divestment that
occurs when local governments voluntarily transfer power to other co-
equal units of government: "Power and participation are inextricably
linked: a sense of powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather than
participation, while the existence of power encourages those able to
participate in its exercise to do so.""' By removing responsibility from
the general purpose government, intergovernmental contracts for services
may reinforce citizen opinions of local government irrelevance and
contribute to the widespread lack of interest in municipal affairs as
expressed in the low (and generally decreasing) rates of voter
participation at the local level. Moreover, following along the lines of a
related Frug critique, the emphasis on municipal services and their
severance from other important local government functions operates to
the detriment of the role of government as community builder and
enhances the "consumer-oriented vision"'44 of local government. And
with that vision comes a fundamental shift in citizen mentality, in which
citizens choose their municipalities in the same way they choose their
television sets, by evaluating where their dollars will go the farthest and
where they will maximize the "get what you pay for" assessment of local
government services.'45
Though the above critique may temper the enthusiasm with which
intergovernmental contracts are embraced by state legislatures and
judiciaries, the New Regionalist might be willing to tolerate the
drawbacks in exchange for the enhanced regional equity the contracts are
said to promote. On closer inspection, however, several potential anti-
regional impacts can be identified. For one thing, as others have noted,
because intergovernmental contracts for services typically encompass
only one subpart of a metropolitan region, the well known prisoners'
dilemma makes it unlikely that an intergovernmental contract for
services will be used to promote regionalization.146
142. See Frug, supra note 29, at 1065.
143. See id. at 1070.
144. See Frug, supra note 33, at 31.
145. See id. at 29.
146. See Cashin, supra note 5, at 1988. As she explains: "the classic collective action problem
occurs when the interest of each individual is too small relative to the costs of participation to justify
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Second, the New Regionalist critique would do well to analyze the
likelihood that the providing entity in an intergovernmental contract will
promote the welfare of its newly enhanced territory, much less the
welfare of the entire region of which it is a part. In that vein, consider the
Durango intergovernmental contract. 147 In an earlier Colorado Supreme
Court opinion in that litigation, which had denied the applicability of
state regulatory oversight of the intergovernmental contract at issue in
Durango, the court noted that the city's proposed county bus service
would provide transportation to nearby ski slopes and to the area's
airport.'48 Although the opinion did not mention whether the frustrated
competitor had provided more extensive county-wide bus service, it is at
least possible that these two presumably more profitable lines subsidized
its provision of transportation services to other parts of the county. The
city's incentive to use the profitable routes for subsidization, of course, is
quite different than that of the private provider. For the city, the profit
derived from the ski slopes and airport routes are more likely to be used
to subsidize intra-city bus service; the city would seem to have no
incentive to provide county service more widely unless its own residents
would profit from that enhanced service.'49 Though this calculation may
be perfectly sensible from the city's own self-interested vantage point
and the welfare of its citizens, the broader welfare of county residents
appears to go unprotected.
Similarly, consider the intergovernmental contract for water and
sewer services described by the Tenth Circuit in an unpublished opinion,
his or her participation, so there is no incentive to take individual action. The collective interest of all
the individuals combined may be very great, but because they are separated from each other, they
either do not see the benefits of organizing or are unable to organize." Id. at n.9. See also Briffault,
supra note 2, at 1147; Harrison, supra note 75, at 147-49. But see Gillette, supra note 18, at 246-50
(arguing that prisoners' dilemma may not apply to some intergovemmental burden sharing).
147. For a description of the intergovernmental contract in that case, see supra notes 123-125 and
accompanying text.
148. See City of Durango v. Durango Transp. Inc., 807 P.2d 1152, 1152 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
149. If the city residents and the county residents have the same interests, the political process, by
protecting the residents' interests, will also protect the interests of nonresidents. Although in some
intergovernmental contracts for service that congruence may exist, the circumstances of Durango are
unlikely to be such a case. With regard to items such as route designation and scheduling, city and
county interests are probably markedly different. In a different context, Professor Clayton Gillette
has noted that residents may sometimes be satisfactory defenders of nonresident interests. Gillette
gave the following example in a discussion of municipal taxation of nonresidents: "shopowners who
fear that nonresident customers will gravitate to suburban shopping malls, or employers of
nonresidents who fear that they will have to increase wages or lose nonresident employees to
suburban employers, should serve as pretty good proxies for those who initially would bear the
incidence of the tax." See Gillette, supra note 18, at 210.
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Haik v. Town ofAlta. 5° In that case, the Town of Alta refused to issue a
building permit for the development of several lots near the local ski
resort. As a prerequisite to the permit, the property owners had to obtain
sewer and water services from Salt Lake, the service provider to Alta.
Pursuant to an intergovernmental contract between Alta and the City of
Salt Lake, however, decisions about the extension of those services were
within Salt Lake's exclusive control.' When the landowner sued Alta to
compel the extension of services, the court upheld the town's right to
rely on the terms of the intergovernmental contract.'52 Because the court
was not concerned with the potential regional impact of this contract, its
opinion did not evaluate whether Salt Lake City could be expected to
protect the welfare of the territory beyond its borders that formed the
basis of the intergovernmental contract. 53 In any dispute, however, the
city is likely, and indeed should be expected, to protect the interests of its
residents over the interests of other parties. 5
It seems unrealistic to expect that regionwide regulatory power can be
exercised fairly by a governmental entity that makes up only a part of the
region being regulated. Political reality and the check of the ballot box
appear to guarantee that elected officials will exercise their duties to the
region through the lens of their constituents' self-interest.
Intergovernmental contracts cannot transform a municipal entity into a
regional entity; they merely enlarge the service area of the provider,
leaving intact the preexisting representational allegiance to the subunit
the provider represents. Contracts for services between general purpose
local governments, then, do not create a mechanism that will bring a
regional approach to the evaluation of regional problems. In the best of
situations, the regional welfare will not suffer. In many others, however,
the potential for elevation of the provider's welfare at the expense of the
broader region is likely, and perhaps inevitable.
Finally, intergovernmental contracts for services can be faulted for
150. D.C. No. 96-CV-732-J, 1999 WL 190717 (10th Cir. April 5, 1999), cert. denied, 120 U.S.
166 (1999).
151. Id. at *1.
152. Id. at *4.
153. Environmentalists have long argued for a more ecologically based distribution of regulatory
power over water resources, thus making the watershed an attractive territorial border. See generally
R.W. ADLER, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. LAW. 973 (1995). It is
doubtful, however, that Salt Lake City would be the proper entity to control that larger territory. In
any event, the agreement between Salt Lake and Alta did not encompass the entire watershed, but
merely extended Salt Lake's power beyond its territorial limits to cover Alta and its environs.
154. See Briffault, supra note 25, at 28; Briffault, supra note 29, at 447-54. So long as state law
authorizes local governments to undertake actions that impose costs on or ignore the regional
welfare, those actions are likely to continue.
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allowing the realization of several anti-regional incentives. By offering
alternatives to service production, municipalities are better equipped to
avoid annexation and consolidation into broader regional units. In reality,
the potential for intergovernmental contracts for services is just one card
in a deck that is already solidly stacked against regionalization in
metropolitan areas. So long as the rules of annexation, incorporation, and
property tax distribution allow the formation of self-contained,
autonomous units within a metropolitan region, intergovernmental
contracts for services will remain an attractive option for local
government entities.
2. Joint Provision of Services
As its name suggests, and in contrast to the contracts for services
described above, a joint services agreement requires that all government
participants be involved in both the production and the provision of the
service that is the subject of the agreement. Just as with contracts for
services, however, the categorization is not rigid. In some instances, joint
services agreements share characteristics with contracts for services. 5
Similarly, the distinction between a joint services agreement and the
creation of a new entity may blur. In a Nebraska case, for instance, the
court was called upon to resolve an intergovernmental dispute arising out
of a joint agreement that established a civil defense agency for a county
and a municipality within its borders. Though the agency was in some
ways an independent entity,'56 both government participants retained
considerable power and ongoing involvement in the agency. In fact, it
was precisely this ambiguity that gave rise to the lawsuit, when the
county purported to exercise its power as employer to fire the director
without the city's approval. The court noted that the intergovernmental
155. See PPC Enters., Inc. v. Texas City, 76 F. Supp. 2d 750 (S.D. Tex. 1999). In this case, two
Texas cities passed identical fireworks bans followed by a mutual agreement that one of the cities
would enforce the ordinance in the other's extraterritorial jurisdiction. The court upheld the
interlocal agreement against challenges that it violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the federal constitution, that it was unconstitutionally vague, and that it exceeded the cities' power
under the state's Interlocal Cooperation Act, TEX. LOc. GOV'T CODE, § 217.042 (Vernon 1998). See
76 F. Supp. 2d at 755-59. For an example of an agreement that actually shows features of all three
categories of intergovemmental cooperation, see Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County
Department of Labor Services, 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981), in which a city and county
entered a "Cooperative Agreement for the Administration of Employment and Training Services"
pursuant to which the county transferred significant authority to the city, yet at the same time
retained important powers over program evaluations and funding. Id. at 189. The agreement also
created a joint City-County joint department, which the court described as "solely an agency of the
city." Id.
156. Creation of a new entity is discussed infra Part A.3.
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agreement provided that employees of the agency served "during the
pleasure" of the county and of the city. As a result, it upheld the county's
prerogative to act individually to terminate the agency's director without
the city's concurrence.'57 The active governmental participation and
retention of government authority displayed in this case is a salient
feature of joint services agreements; though precise categorization may
be impossible, some generalizations do appear.'58
At the risk of oversimplification, and in light of the above caveat,
joint services agreements most typically involve one of two fact patterns.
Most common of all, perhaps, are the many mutual aid provisions
executed by neighboring municipal governments. Pursuant to these
agreements, local governments cross-cede extra-jurisdictional
enforcement powers to police, fire, and emergency service providers.
Mutual aid agreements are typically designed to allow for emergency
back-ups, or to authorize a municipal officer to complete a traffic or
criminal chase begun in his or her own territory. 159 Courts are usually
157. Heinzman v. Hall County, 328 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Neb. 1983). For an example of other
intergovernmental agreements that display characteristics of a joint services agreement as well as
involving intergovernmental creation of a new entity, see, e.g., Borough of Lewistown v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 735 A.2d 1240 (Pa. 1999). In this unusual case, three
municipal governments created a regional police department. Pursuant to the intergovernmental
agreement establishing it, the police department was under the control of an appointed board of
directors. The municipalities delegated to the board "all the functions, powers and responsibilities
which the municipalities respectively have with respect to the operation, management, and
administration of a municipal police department," id. at 1241 n.3. In resolving the labor dispute
before it, the court held that the constituent members of the regional department were also deemed to
be the employers of the complaining police officers. See id. at 1244-45. See also City of Oakland v.
Williams, 103 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1940) (upholding joint action taken by seven municipalities to
plan for joint sewage disposal services; agreement created joint agency and then transferred all
decisionmaking authority to one of signatory municipalities); Magnon v. Acadian Metro. Code
Auth., 413 So.2d 972, 973 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (joint services agreement for licensing contractors
resulted in creation of intergovernmental public corporate body, the Metropolitan Code Authority);
Ky-Ind. Mun. Power Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 393 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)
(joint agreement created an agency that was an "instrumentality of the cities," indicating ongoing
municipal involvement and control over the agency, notwithstanding its corporate existence as a
separate legal entity).
158. In terms of frequency, the ACIR study on intergovernmental cooperative efforts noted that
local governments tend to use joint service agreements for the same types of services, for the same
reasons, and with approximately the same frequency as they use contracts for services. See ACIR,
supra note 20, at 30-35. The survey did note, however, that local officials evaluated contracts for
services more positively than joint service arrangements. Id. at 43. Unfortunately, it did not indicate
the basis of that more favorable assessment.
159. For examples of cases in which courts have upheld mutual aid agreements, see, e.g., State v.
Hauser, No. 97-1-00152, 2001 WL 1287831, at *4 (Wash. App. 2001); Commonwealth v.
McCrohan, 610 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (arresting police officer acted lawfully
pursuant to a mutual aid agreement); State v. Rasmussen, 70 Wn. App. 853, 858, 855 P.2d 1206,
1209 (1993) (same). A similar type of joint services agreement, providing "mutual aid" of another
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quite deferential to the goal of intergovernmental cooperation in this
context and routinely reject challenges to official actions taken pursuant
to these agreements. 16°
The second common type of joint services agreement, broader in its
scope than the typical mutual aid agreement, facilitates the
implementation of a jointly articulated program or regulatory goal.
Consider, for instance, the facts of State v. Plaggemeier,161 which
involved a five-party intergovernmental contract to implement a county-
wide drunk driving effort. In addition to the agreement's mutual aid
provision, 162 it established a joint task force and other coordinating
mechanisms.'63 Other common types of joint services agreements involve
some division of labor between the participating governments based on
the expertise or specialized interests of the different units. An agreement
between the Port of Seattle and the City of SeaTac, for instance,
authorized joint provision of some services while transferring authority
over other services to one of the two participating units of government."
type, consists of joint insurance pools, see Washington Public Utility Districts' Utilities System v.
Public Utility District No. 1, 112 Wash. 2d 1, 6-10, 771 P.2d 701, 704-06 (1989) (upholding joint
self-insurance agreement).
160. In fact, one New Jersey court upheld the validity of a search and seizure conducted by one
police officer within the jurisdiction of another city, even though the two municipalities operated
under an informal, unwritten policy of mutual aid. See State v. Montalvo, 655 A.2d 476, 480 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). See also Commonwealth v. Mays, 431 A.2d 322 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1981)
(rejecting challenge to police officer's extraterritorial arrest that had not followed mutual aid
agreement provision that police assistance would be provided to neighboring units "upon proper
request" by one of the units). But see State v. Allen, 790 So.2d 1122, 1124-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (invalidating seizure of marijuana by city police officer at county residence; quoting mutual
aid agreement provision that city police "shall not routinely commence investigations of crimes or
actively seek out criminal activity outside of their primary jurisdiction," and stressing that court
would not allow mutual aid agreements to expand police power jurisdiction).
161. 93 Wash. App. 472, 969 P.2d 519 (1999).
162. In the case, the court used the mutual aid agreement to uphold the arrest of the defendant by
a police officer acting outside his city limits. See id. at 483, 969 P.2d at 525.
163. Id. at 474-75, 969 P.2d at 521. The court actually invalidated that part of the agreement, not
because it was beyond the scope of intergovernmental cooperation, but rather because the legislative
bodies of the participating entities had not ratified the mutual endeavor. Id. at 481-82, 969 P.2d at
524. Under the state's Mutual Aid Act, the individual sheriff or chief of police can enter binding
mutual aid agreements with neighboring municipalities, see WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070 (2002).
The more general Interlocal Cooperation Act, WASH. REv. CODE § 39.34 (2000), however, requires
that intergovernmental cooperative efforts receive ratification by the governing legislative bodies.
164. In Teamsters Union Local 117 v. Port of Seattle, No. 36366-2-I, 1996 WL 523973 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1996) (unpublished opinion), the Port of Seattle (owner of the Seattle-Tacoma Airport)
leased property to the city of SeaTac for municipal operation of a park. Id. at *1. The joint
agreement established "concurrent law enforcement jurisdiction" in the park, but specified that
emergency 911 services would be provided by the city, whereas the Port would "retain primary
responsibility for all law enforcement related to airport operations." Id.
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In both of these cases, units of local government were able to advance
their own constituency's health, safety, and welfare by acting jointly to
articulate and implement common policies.
Because joint services agreements may blur or eliminate the lines
between provider and recipient of services, difficult interpretative
questions may arise about the scope of the powers being shared by the
participating entities.'65 A comparison of two judicial opinions nicely
illustrates the analytical problem. In In re Condemnation of 30.60 Acres
of Land," the court upheld the joint condemnation of land for
construction of a school and public park facility pursuant to an
agreement between a township and a school district.'67 Under applicable
state law, the township had condemnation power exclusively for park
purposes, while the school district was authorized to condemn land only
for use as a public school. Focusing on the fact that each local
governmental unit possessed condemnation power, the court found that
the agreement was lawful. It rejected the landowner's argument that,
because the school district has no power to engage in park purposes and
the township cannot build schools, the agreement had improperly
enhanced each entity's government powers through the subterfuge of an
intergovernmental contract.
68
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reached the opposite
result in Gallagher v. City of Omaha,69 when it invalidated a similar
joint agreement. In that case, the city and a state university negotiated an
intergovernmental use agreement whereby the city authorized the
university to construct and use parking facilities on city park land.
During the week, from 7 a.m. until 10:00 p.m., the facilities were to be
used exclusively by the university; at all other times, the usage was joint.
Although the court noted that the city was authorized to provide parking
for its park patrons, it concluded that the interlocal agreement constituted
an improper diversion of park lands. 70 Thus, for the 30.60 Acres court,
the joint exercise of powers could extend to include actions that only one
of the units could have lawfully undertaken while acting individually. In
contrast, the Gallagher court implicitly rejected that argument and
165. This discussion patterns the "mutuality of powers" vs. "power of one unit" debate in
intergovernmental contracts for services, see supra notes 116-117, but the courts do not appear to
use those labels to delineate the disputes in the context ofjoint services agreements.
166. 572 A.2d 242 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
167. Seeid. at 245.
168. See id. at 244.
169. 204 N.W.2d 157 (Neb. 1973).
170. Id. at 160-62.
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invalidated the joint agreement because, though all actions were within
the scope of power of one of the contracting entities, neither unit had the
power to engage in all of the activities undertaken pursuant to the
contract's terms.
The decision to enter a joint services agreement requires a
commitment to a formal, ongoing relationship with another unit of local
government. To a lesser extent than in the typical contract for services,
governments entering joint services agreement assume a certain risk of
incompatibility in the execution of the agreement. Presumably, each unit
has satisfied itself that its partner's policies are consistent with its own;
otherwise, the mutual provision of a service or enforcement of
extraterritorial powers runs the risk that the "foreign" entity will violate
the other's policies. Once the agreement is operational, moreover, all
government participants are actively involved in the ongoing
implementation of its terms. 7'
Although they may be more cumbersome to implement and execute,
joint services agreements may offer several attractive qualities to local
governments. First, and in contrast to contracts for services, they are less
likely to involve a relinquishment of local police power or other
governmental autonomy, because each entity is an active participant in
the provision of the service or in the implementation of the policy under
contract. In addition, the ongoing involvement, though it may be more
costly, has the added benefit of making it more likely that each unit will
be able to ensure compliance with its own goals and interests. Again in
171. This continuous involvement of multiple entities of government may create difficult
questions regarding legal liability. For example, the nature of each entity's involvement in the joint
agreement may have important implications for tort immunity or workers compensation issues. See,
e.g., Drain v. Galveston County, 999 F. Supp. 929, 937 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (city may be liable for
actions of county employee who responded pursuant to mutual aid agreement); Hauber v. County of
Yakima, 107 Wash. App. 437, 440, 27 P.3d 257, 260 (2001) (extent of recovery by widow of
firefighter depends on whether deceased was acting pursuant to normal firefighter duties, a mutual
aid agreement, or as a member of a special search and rescue team); Ewing v. State, 757 So.2d 843,
847 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding joint agreement to pay for and cover drainage ditch insufficient to
impose tort liability on contributing entities); N.H. Ins. Co. v. City of Madera, 192 Cal. Rpt. 548,
550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding city immune while engaged in fighting fires extends to county
firefighters who responded to alarm pursuant to mutual aid agreement); Garcia v. City of South
Tucson, 640 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (city police officer injured while responding to
mutual aid agreement request not limited to workers compensation relief because mutual aid
agreement does not transform requesting city into statutory employer of injured officer); Murphy v.
City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 630 P.2d 186, 189, 192-93 (Kan. App.
1981) (determining program administered solely by city, though jointly sponsored by city and
county may create county liability under Workmen's Compensation Act for alleged retaliatory
discharge); Lauria v. Borough of Ridgefield, 291 A.2d 155, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972)
(only holding responding municipality to be liable to estate of firefighter killed during fire in
summoning municipality pursuant to mutual aid agreement).
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contrast to contracts for services, and because of the cooperative
implementation of the agreement, the danger of subversion of the
receiving entity's interests is minimized.
From a regional standpoint, a review of the case law and the literature
suggests that joint services agreements have not been used to provide a
truly regional solution to metropolitan area problems. Rather, and
perhaps because of the need for ongoing monitoring and involvement,
the agreements tend to be narrowly defined and limited. Generally, joint
services agreements involve, not an attempt to implement a grand joint
vision for improving the overall welfare of the constituents of all
participating governments, but rather a carefully delineated description
of specific ways in which joint action will complement pre-existing local
government policy. In terms of the New Regionalists' hopes for
regionwide articulation of a common agenda, however, joint services
agreements offer one potential advantage over contracts for services. As
Professor Cashin has noted, "locational sorting '  on the basis of race
and socioeconomic class is extremely strong in metropolitan areas. To
the extent that joint services agreements require meaningful cross-
boundary collaboration and joint exercise of powers, they may create an
opportunity for highly segregated local governments to become
acquainted with "the other."' 73 Unlike the contract for services, in which
one government cedes total responsibility for performance and
implementation of contract obligations to the providing entity, a joint
services agreement may provide an intangible boost to the reduction of
barriers between communities and the enhancement of a sense of true
regional community.
3. Creation of a New Government Entity
Despite the anti-regionalist ethic that pervades local government law,
the United States has no shortage of regionwide governmental units.
With a few notable exceptions, 74 however, these are not general purpose,
172. See Cashin, supra note 5, at 2016.
173. Professor Cashin describes how the desire for lower taxes, avoidance of redistribution of tax
dollars, and racial exclusionary intent are important catalysts for "sectoral segregation" in
metropolitan areas. Id. at 2016. In his analysis of that phenomenon, Professor Frug used the
metaphor of local governments as exclusive country clubs, where residents equate taxes with dues.
See Frug, supra note 33, at 29. These critiques are based on the reality that territorial boundaries in
metropolitan America, notwithstanding the frequency with which they are crossed, are nevertheless
quite effective in establishing the "us" vs. "them" mentality at the level of local government.
174. The Minneapolis area's Met Council, Portland's Metropolitan Service District, and Seattle's
Metro are examples of single purpose regional districts that have evolved into government units with
a broader mandate. For a discussion of the history and scope of operation of these entities, see
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or even multi-purpose, elected entities. Rather, the well documented
government growth industry across the country consists of single
purpose governments, generically known as special districts"' or
public authorities. 77 While the numbers of other local government units
remains more or less constant, special districts continue to increase.
7 8
Special districts vary greatly in terms of the territory they service:
while some are sub-local in scope, others are coterminous with existing
VALENTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 425-66. See also Briffault, supra note 2, at 1118-19; Cashin,
supra note 5, at 2028-33.
175. Although the special district is but one type of single purpose local government unit, the
Article uses the terms interchangeably.
176. Regional special districts are sometimes referred to as "quasi-municipal corporations;"
though in some ways they act like municipalities, their powers may be quite narrowly focused.
Special districts may have a range of revenue raising powers, see, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. 19/160.1
(1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2769-70 (1995), the ability to condemn property, see, e.g., WASH.
REv. CODE § 14.07.020 (1993); Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Ass 'n v. Cherokee Village
Road & Street Improvement District No. 1, 455 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Ark. 1970), and the power to enact
and enforce ordinances, Village of Glencoe v. Metro. Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 320 N.E.
2d 524, 528-29 (111. App. Ct. 1974).
The legal status of regional special districts has been litigated in a variety of contexts. If, for
instance, a regional special district is deemed to be a municipal corporation, it will not be entitled to
assert the state's sovereign immunity; if it constitutes an instrumentality of the state, in contrast,
sovereign immunity will attach. See, e.g., Calvert Invs. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro.
Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133, 138-39 (Ky. 1991) (regional special district, as a municipal
corporation, is liable under state tort law). The scope of potential liability may also depend on its
characterization. For instance, a Texas court concluded that a regional transit authority performed
essential public functions, and thus was protected by a statutory damages cap available to
governmental, but not proprietary, activities undertaken by local governments. Salvatierra v. Via
Metro. Transit Auth., 974 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). See also Scott v. Shapiro, 339
A.2d 597, 599 (Pa. 1975) (Southern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority not a state
instrumentality and thus immune from state sunshine laws requiring disclosure and transparency in
state proceedings); Fisher v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 431 A.2d 394, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)
(Authority not subject to state law that provides full pay to state employees while they are on active
duty with any reserve unit of the armed services).
177. Public authorities, which are single purpose governments designed to be led by professional,
apolitical managers, became popular in the 1920s as part of reform movements intending to take
power away from corrupt political bosses. These newly created entities, which typically have no
taxing power but are able to borrow and issue bonds, took control over a number of public sector
functions. They were seen as embodying the "values of efficiency, neutral competence, and
professionalism in municipal affairs .. " Foster, supra note 24, at 18. The success of the Port
Authority of New York (and later of New Jersey) spurred widespread adoption of this model of
government. Id.
178. Between 1952 and 1997, the number of special purpose governments nearly tripled, rising
from 12,340 to 34,683. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, Volume 1,
Government Organization 4, 6 (2002). Over that same time period, subcounty general purpose local
governments increased from 34,009 to 36,001. Id. at 4. In comparison to other units of local
government, the proportion of spending by special districts has increased two to three times nore
quickly. See Foster, supra note 24, at 1-3.
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municipal boundaries, and still others extend beyond the borders of
existing municipal governments. Approximately eighty percent of all
single purpose governments are created at the supra-municipal level, thus
encompassing the territory of more than one general purpose local
government. These regional special districts either serve some section of
a county, an entire county, or multiple counties.'79 In addition to the
differences in their geographical scope, single purpose governments vary
with regard to their revenue raising abilities: while some have general
taxation powers, others are restricted to user fees or other more specific
revenue raising devices. 8° A similar range of variation occurs in their
manner of creation. Some are formed directly by state legislation,' some
by petition of citizens,'82 and others by voluntary local government
action."' Because this Article focuses on the regional impact of
intergovernmental cooperation, it does not specifically evaluate regional
special districts created by the state. Much of the following critique,
179. The remaining 20% are either co-terminous with municipal borders or cover a section of a
municipal government See Foster, supra note 24, at 123.
180. Special districts exercise a wide range of revenue raising powers, and the scope of those
powers appear unaffected by whether the district has appointed or elected commissioners. See note
186, infra. Many special districts whose commissioners are appointed exercise general powers of
taxation. Courts have generally approved of this combination. See, e.g., Solomon v. N. Shore
Sanitary Dist., 269 N.E.2d 457, 464 (111. 1971); Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 177
N.W.2d 131, 138-39 (Wis. 1970); Buffalo, Dawson, Mechanicsburg Sewer Comm'n v. Boggs, 470
N.E.2d 649, 651-53 (111. App. Ct. 1984). Some special districts are limited to recouping their
operating costs through charging user fees. See, e.g., Beatty v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 867
S.W.2d 217, 221 (Mo. 1993) (describing district's power to collect user charges and per unit charges
for capital improvements, but holding that district must get voter approval to raise the rates). Some
are allowed to levy property taxes. See, e.g., City Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist.,
491 N.W.2d 484, 492, 498 (Wis. 1992) (authorizing district to charge for capital costs on the basis of
property value); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.44.060(6) (2002) (authorizing hospital district to levy a
property tax "not to exceed fifty cents per thousand dollars of assessed value, and an additional
annual tax on all taxable property within such public hospital district not to exceed twenty-five cents
per thousand dollars of assessed value"). Other special districts impose general charges on property
and activity within the district. See, e.g., Anema v. Transit Constr. Auth., 788 P.2d 1261, 1263
(Colo. 1990) (affirming district's ability to finance planning of a transit system by imposing a charge
on all commercial property and by levying an "employment assessment" on each employer). Still
others can impose sales taxes. See, e.g., Camp v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 189 S.E.2d 56,
61 (Ga. 1972) (upholding legislative delegation of sales tax power to regional special district to fund
rapid transit system).
181. See, e.g., Seto v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 814 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Or. 1991);
Hoogasian v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 317 N.E.2d 534, 536 (III. 1974).
182. See, e.g., Reg'l Serv. Auth. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 618 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Colo. 1980);
State ex rel. Angel Fire Home & Land Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. S. Cent. Colfax County Special Hosp.
Dist., 797 P.2d 285,286 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
183. See, e.g., Goreham v. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449, 452
(Iowa 1970). For a general survey of the ways in which regional special districts are created, see
Foster, supra note 24, at 7-15.
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however, may be relevant to an assessment of those state-created districts
as well. 84
Many commentators have criticized single purpose governments as
anti-democratic and anti-localist.'85 These critics have noted, for
instance, that special districts are unaccountable18 6 and invisible. 7 They
184. In fact, some of the following critique of regional special districts may have less to do with
their voluntariness and more to do with shortcomings of regional special districts in general.
Nevertheless, because of the enthusiasm with which New Regionalists have turned to regional
special districts in their search for regional redistribution, this Section will suggest a number of
criticisms that may apply primarily to state-created regional special districts. In addition, it is
important to keep in mind that every regional special district will not display all of the weaknesses
identified in the following section.
185. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 39; Frug, supra note 15, at 1781-88; Gillette, supra note 18, at
204-06.
186. Commissioners or trustees of regional special districts are often appointed, either directly by
the state or by elected officials of the government units that are located within the district's territory.
Many single purpose local governments are immune from the judicial doctrine that requires
proportionally elected, rather than appointed, officials. As first established in Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1968), the one person, one vote principle applies to general purpose
local government units. In a series of cases, the Court has articulated an exception to that principle to
allow restrictions on or elimination of the franchise for "special limited purpose districts" whose
actions disproportionately affect those who are assessed financial charges by the government unit.
See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973); Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981). For a full discussion of the difficult legal questions surrounding
the right to vote and limited purpose governments, see Richard Briffault, ho Rules at Home: One
Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 339 (1993); Richard Briffault, A
Government For Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 365, 434-46 (1999); see also VALENTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 81-147. So long as the
government unit does not exercise general governance powers, states retain broad discretion over the
manner in which special district commissioners are selected. Courts routinely reject challenges to
appointed special district commissioners. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit
Auth., 636 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding one person, one vote principle not applicable to
transit authority); Eastern v. Canty, 389 N.E.2d 1160, 1165-69 (111. 1979) (upholding method of
appointing sanitary district commissioners; extent of county boards' appointment powers determined
by percentage of total assessed property each county had in district's territory); Van Zanen v.
Keydel, 280 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding appointment of commissioners of
metropolitan district with powers to establish and operate parks; one county-one commissioner
allocation valid notwithstanding wide divergence of population among member counties). If a
special purpose district acquires additional powers and expands its functions, however, at some point
the norm of one person, one vote will apply. Cunningham v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle,
751 F. Supp. 885, 889-90 (W.D. Wash. 1990) traces the history of Seattle's "metropolitan municipal
corporation," a local government entity (Metro) created in 1958 to provide regional sewer services
and focus on the area's urgent water quality problems. Pursuant to state law, members on Metro's
governing council were appointed by the legislative bodies of the participating government units. By
the late 1980s, Metro's functions had grown to include the provision of mass transit services and the
development of regional land use planning policies. See id. at 890. In Cunningham the court found
that one person, one vote applied to Metro and invalidated the manner of selection of its council
members. As the unelected commissioners of many special districts are granted substantial control of
regional services and revenues, and as many regional special districts are granted substantial taxing
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are frequently immune from land use regulations and free to disregard
local concerns. 8 They may allow local governments to pass the buck on
difficult policy questions,'89 to avoid tort liability,' 90 and to avoid state
authority, metropolitan area voters lose the ability to define and shape the important government
services that affect their daily lives. See VALENTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 439-47.
187. Even when special district commissioners are elected, the elections can rarely attract more
than a 5% voter turnout. See BURNS, supra note 39, 12-13 (1994). Bums also explains her claim that
the invisibility of special districts has both positive and negative effects: "the benefits of special
districts are that they can fund and provide services and infrastructure; they are able to get things
done in a fragmented American polity. The difficulties are two: They do this while no one watches
except interested developers, and they are gradually becoming the realm where much of the
substance of local politics happens. Thus local politics becomes quiet, not necessarily
through... consensus.. . , but rather through the invisibility of special district politics." Id. at 117.
Moreover, because their purpose is so narrowly defined, regional special districts frequently remain
below the metropolitan area political radar screen. Even for the diligent citizen, identification of all
local government units in a metropolitan area may prove daunting. See WEIHER, supra note 40, at
17-19 (summarizing several studies that describe the complexity of mapping local government units
in metropolitan areas and noting the frequency with which citizens are unaware of local government
structures that apply to them).
188. Coupling immunity from zoning laws with the narrow purpose of the special district's
mission creates potential for enormous conflict at the local level. See, e.g., Austin Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670, 675 (Tex. 1973) (determining regional school district able
to build large football stadium and field house in violation of small town's zoning ordinance);
Evanston v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 559 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding RTA's proposal
to construct a bus storage and maintenance facility immune from city zoning ordinances); City of
Heath v. Licking County Reg'l Airport, 237 N.E.2d 173, 179 (Ohio Misc. 1967) (ruling airport
authority's proposal to widen runways immune from local zoning).
189. Transferring the responsibility for a contentious local issue to an appointed body may ease
the political heat on elected officials. For example, in Barnes v. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 341 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1984), the court essentially refused to let participating
municipalities transfer decisionmaking responsibility over the siting of public housing to a regional
housing authority they had created pursuant to the state's intergovernmental cooperation statute.
Because the cities themselves would have been unable to approve a low-income housing project
without city council approval, the housing authority was similarly limited. Id. at 768. Thus, the court
concluded that the housing authority's decisions required approval by the city councils of all
participating entities. Id. This opinion seems inconsistent with two other Iowa Supreme Court
interpretations of the status of government entities created pursuant to intergovernmental
cooperation. In Goreham v. Des Moines Metropolitian Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449,
455 (Iowa 1970), the court upheld the creation of a regional solid waste district against challenges
that the participating local governments had improperly delegated power to that agency. Similarly, in
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Emmet County Council of Governments, 355 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Iowa 1984),
the court recognized that the county council of governments had broad powers, including
[Tihe right to acquire and dispose of property, the right to enter contracts, the right to operate a
solid waste disposal and collection service, . . . the right to fix and charge fees for its services,
the right to establish a budgeting system .... the right to borrow money and issue bonds, the
right to provide for remedies in the event of default ....
1d. at 589. Presumably, if the city itself were to exercise those powers, many, if not all of the actions
would require city council action. It is perhaps no coincidence that the court was less deferential to
the regional housing authority's claimed power to site low income housing; the Barnes case,
ironically, represents a rare example of a group of municipalities joining together to provide a social
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limitations on borrowing and spending.' 9' Though touted as a way to
reduce the cost of service provision, services provided by special districts
may actually be more expensive than those produced and provided
directly by the general purpose government itself.92 And for the
service on a regionwide basis. It appears that some state courts may share the anti-regional bias of
their citizens when it comes to municipal attempts to provide a regionwide solution to difficult social
problems. Or it may be that the court was reluctant to let elected municipal officials avoid the
political accountability that comes with being forced to take a position on contentious issues such as
public housing. In general, though, the unaccountability phenomenon may be doubly perverse.
General purpose governments become less accountable to their own constituency by transferring
power to local government units that themselves are frequently unaccountable.
190. Parties injured by negligent actions taken by regional special districts or who seek to
challenge other aspects of the district's operations are likely to be limited to the intergovernmental
entity as a source of recovery. As a separately organized governmental body, it is a distinct unit of
government. Courts have been reluctant to impose liability on the constituent members of the special
district. See. e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp., 355 N.W.2d at 591 (government creators of joint county
council not liable on suit for breach of contract filed against county council).
191. In essence, regional special districts may offer an attractive way for a local government unit
to circumvent taxing, borrowing, or spending limits. Creation of a new unit of government brings
with it an untapped line of taxing, borrowing, and spending opportunities. See BURNS, supra note
39, at 16, in which she described the common wisdom that formation of special districts is "largely a
technical financing maneuver." Though Bums recognizes the strength of that dynamic, she believes
that it is an incomplete explanation, because it ignores the real, political struggle that frequently
underlies the formation of special districts. Id.; see also Foster, supra note 24, at 16-17. Foster also
describes how, in the state of New York, public authorities are the only units of local government
able to issue revenue bonds that are not backed by the full faith and credit of the lending unit. Since
all other units of government have strict limits on the amount of full faith and credit debt they can
incur, public authorities become an even more attractive mechanism for financing the construction of
capital infrastructure. See id. at 11. Courts typically reject arguments that a special district was
created for the sole purpose of evading other provisions of state laws. See. e.g., Rider v. City of San
Diego, 959 P.2d 347, 350-51 (Cal. 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs' arguments that special district created
to finance a new convention center was no more than a "hollow shell that exists only on paper,"
noting that the newly created district was run, financed, and managed by the city that created it
solely for the purpose of avoiding restrictions on municipal debt); Johnson v. Piedmont Mun. Power
Agency, 287 S.E.2d 476, 480-81,484 (S.C. 1982) (holding state constitutional requirement for voter
approval of local government debt not applicable to intergovernmental agency; while dissenting
Judge Littlejohn characterizes the intergovernmental entity as an "alter ego created for the purpose
of doing indirectly that which the Constitution forbids municipalities to do directly"); Goreham v.
Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449, 463 (Iowa 1970) (Becker, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the creation of the new regional special district as a "barely-disguised
technique for debt ceiling avoidance"). For those who view these state limits on local revenue
powers as archaic and unresponsive to modem economic realities, evasion of the limits may seem
desirable. By providing an easy end run around a state imposed limitation, however, courts have
allowed legislatures to avoid grappling with difficult policy issues about the proper parameters of
local government borrowing. See generally VALENTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 671-716 for analysis
of the growing use of "non-debt debt" as a way for municipal governments to raise revenue without
running afoul of state law limits.
192. In her recently published book, Professor Kathryn Foster documented that services provided
by special district cost more than those provided by multi-purpose municipal governments. See
Foster, supra note 24, at 148-85. As Professor Foster noted, however, higher cost does not
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participation theory of localism, which stresses the importance of the
local government as an accountable, responsive unit of government,
special districts can be criticized for the ways in which they disempower
the general purpose government that created them.'93
necessarily indicate less efficiency; that is, regional special districts may provide a higher level and
quality of service than the general purpose government service provider. Id. at 184. Foster's
findings, however, should give pause to the many supporters of regional special districts who tout
their ability to achieve cost savings in the provision of urban services. See, e.g., Connelly v. Clark
County, 307 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (noting that cost savings was an important
rationale when reviewing the history of the Illinois constitutional amendment authorizing
intergovernmental cooperation).
193. By assuming control of a function that would otherwise be left to the multi-purpose local
government, the creation of a regional special district strips the participating municipal governments
of some of their powers and excludes them from participation in the regional enterprise of the
district. It is true that municipalities may voluntarily relinquish power to other government units by
transferring power to a regional special district, for some of the reasons noted earlier in this Section.
The fact of voluntariness, however, does not disprove the underlying claim that the transfer of power
to an obscure single purpose government may create a municipal government that is less important
and less relevant in the eyes of its citizens. In some major metropolitan areas, where regional special
districts number in the hundreds, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the loss of local control over
and input into numerous important regional issues contributes to the well-documented loss of citizen
interest and involvement in their municipal governments. In the legal literature, Professor Gerald
Frog is a passionate supporter of increased local power. See generally GERALD E. FRUG, CITY
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999). He has long pointed to local
government powerlessness as one of the main reasons for citizen cynicism and apathy. See Frug,
supra note 29.
In some situations, states or citizens may have the statutory authority to create a regional special
district that will take over service provision from a general purpose municipal government. See, e.g.,
Reg'l Serv. Auth. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 618 P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1980) (describing regional
service authority created by petition of citizens over objection of county board). Of course, state-
created special districts are frequently done with no regard for concerns about municipal
disempowerment.
Courts have generally rejected challenges that the creation of regional special districts
impermissibly interferes with home rule authority or local autonomy generally. But compare Seto v.
Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 814 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Or. 1991) (rejecting municipality's
argument of impermissible interference with home rule powers), with Four-County Metro. Capital
Improvement Dist. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of County of Adams, 369 P.2d 67, 73 (Colo. 1962)
(opposite conclusion).
In addition to the somewhat ephemeral disempowerment argument, the proliferation of regional
special districts may deprive the municipalities in a region of an important bargaining chip as they
seek to bring urbanized development within their borders. If many basic urban services are provided
by special districts, rather than by municipalities, property owners in the unincorporated territory on
the fringes of metropolitan areas have less incentive to seek annexation to the general purpose local
governments they abut. See Fond du Lac Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Miller, 166 N.W.2d 225, 229-30,
(Wis. 1969) (acknowledging the problem, but noting judiciary's obligation to uphold the formation
of the special district under the terms of state law). Many state statutes express a clear desire that
urbanization occur within municipal government borders, rather than in unincorporated areas of the
county. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-12-102 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. § 414.01 (2001); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33,160A-45 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-51.2-02 (1983) NEV. REV. STAT.
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Notwithstanding these many criticisms, much of the New Regionalist
literature touts regional special districts as a means of achieving
regionalism while preserving localism. And at first glance, regional
special districts appear to promote many of the New Regionalists' goals.
Regional special districts are an attractive way to free local government
services from the artificial barriers created by political boundaries, which
usually do not reflect the natural geographic or economic territory that
would achieve greater efficiencies of scale. Moreover, regional special
districts appear to corroborate the New Regionalist claim of the
economic interdependence of the metropolitan area. After all, by
providing a service to all members of a region that would otherwise not
be available on a smaller scale, regional special districts promote the
welfare of favored quarter and urban core alike. And finally, regional
special districts, though they may add another layer of government, do
not disturb the pre-existing landscape of independent local government
units. For many New Regionalists, then, regional special districts present
a cost-free win-win situation for all constituent governments in a
metropolitan region.'94 This enthusiastic endorsement of voluntary
regional governance efforts, however, merits rethinking.
First, regional special districts are myopic. By definition, they are
concerned with one issue only, be it transportation, sewage, water, flood
control, or a similar regional infrastructure problem. They ignore broader
questions about the general welfare, focusing instead on their own
limited mandate.'95 Second, in addition to being expensive, it is fair to
268.572 (1997). At the same time, though, the laws allowing for the creation of special districts to
provide regionwide services severely limit the municipality's ability to achieve that state goal.
194. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
195. Consider the following description of regional special districts in California:
The South Coast Air Quality Management District exercises such immense powers over vehicle
use, traffic congestion, land use, and job growth that many people call it a de facto regional
government-albeit unelected and essentially unaccountable. The L.A. region also has
multihundred-million or billion-dollar-a-year special districts in charge of transportation, water
supply, waste disposal. Each agency's professionals do what seems logical from their own
narrow point of view-building roads or transit lines, cleaning up L.A.'s putrid air, dealing with
toxic wastes, for example. But not one of them is entrusted with the whole-seeing whether and
how the pieces fit together. Cumulatively, for example, they spend $71 million a year on
planning activities, virtually none of it coordinated.
PEIRCE, supra note 9, at 318.
Similarly, Professor Foster concludes that "The Achilles' heel of specialized service delivery is its
inability to coordinate the planning, budgeting, and delivery of services throughout a metropolitan
area... When coordination problems occur in a specialized world with separate water, sewer,
utility, and highway districts,... these problems are predictable outcomes of institutional autonomy
combined with functional specialization." See Foster, supra note 24, at 230.
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say that regional special districts are greedy. As Professor Kathryn Foster
has established, regional special districts capture a bigger slice of the
budget than occurs when those same services compete for funds from a
general purpose local government.'96 Isolated, single purpose districts are
able to avoid what is known as "full-line forcing,"'97 that is, having to
compete for their budget dollars with demands for a variety of other
services being funded by the same local government. Overall, services
provided by special districts get a higher percentage of the available
revenues than would be allocated to that service if it were provided by
the general purpose government. As a necessary corollary, then, because
the total amount of available revenues does not necessarily change when
service provision is shifted to a special district, the funds available for
services not provided by the special district may experience an overall
decrease.
Third, regional special districts may allow a small segment of the
community to act in disregard of the broader general welfare. When
citizens are able to establish the borders of a regional special district,
they can draw the lines in ways that will enhance the value of the
property within the district, which in turn will frequently determine the
revenue-raising capabilities of the district. Conferring district-drawing
ability on self-interested property owners, though it may appear to
facilitate regionalization, does not necessarily guarantee fair allocation of
regional burdens. Rather, it merely substitutes one narrow self-interested
The uni-dimensional nature of the regional special district's mission may also result in a failure to
address locale-specific problems caused by the district's operations. Consider, for instance the facts
of Tri-County Metropolitan Transp. District v. Beaverton, 888 P.2d 74, 78-79 (Or. App. 1995). In
that case, the court upheld the district's unwillingness to respond to municipal concerns about certain
details involving the location and amenities to be provided in a local train station being built by the
district. Id. Though the dispute over whether the district had to install rest rooms and drinking
fountains can hardly be defined as having transcendent importance, it illustrates how a special
district frequently has no incentive to consider questions of local welfare.
196. Foster notes that most commentators, except those who subscribe to the public choice
approach to local government, view special districts as a "legal but underhanded means to achieve
greater spending on a service than would occur in a more competitive setting for resource
allocation." Foster, supra note 24, at 190.
197. For a full explanation of the way in which special districts are able to capture greater
percentages of government revenues by avoiding "full-line forcing," see id. at 189-217. In this
regard, joint services agreements may offer a distinct advantage over special districts. Because all
joint services agreements leave political and fiscal responsibility with each individual participating
unit, the phenomenon of full line forcing will apply to the allocation of resources to the items served
by the joint services agreement. See WILLIAM G. COLMAN, A QUIET REVOLUTION IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCE: POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES IN EXPANDING THE ROLE OF
USER CHARGES IN FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 10-13 (1983) (describing the
political impact of increased local government user charges. He notes that user fees create a
protected stream of revenue that are not "unbundled" at general revenue and budget sessions).
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calculation for another.198
Fourth, regional special districts sustain a myth of self-sufficiency.
Though they generally require massive infusions of government funds to
pay for their initial capital construction,'99 they typically impose user fees
to cover at least a share of their operating costs. As citizens have to reach
for their wallet each time they use the service, they come to believe that
these services fall into the "get what you pay for" model of local
government. Thus, the prevalence of fees as a revenue raising
mechanism for regional special districts may have a significant impact on
the mindset of the individual service user. If the regional services that I
use are funded by fees, the reasoning goes, why should I support
redistribution of my tax dollars to fund regional social services, all of
which will be funded by tax revenues rather than by user fees?2 0
Resistance to increased taxation for social services grows because of the
belief that taxes are used only to redistribute wealth to the poor, while
users pay their own way for other regional services. This anti-tax
mentality, however, ignores the infusion of government money that
subsidizes regional infrastructure.
Fifth, and perhaps somewhat perversely, regional special districts may
impose greater costs on urban residents than on suburban residents. In
part, this is due to the higher cost of providing services to low density
sprawling suburbs than to dense urban areas.20 1 In part, too, it may be due
198. In State ex. rel. Angel Fire Home & Land Owners Ass'n v. South Central Colfax County
Special Hospital District, 797 P.2d 285, 287 (N.M. App. Ct. 1990), for example, objecting property
owners argued that their property had been included in a proposed hospital district solely because of
its high assessed value. They complained that though residents of their area contained only one
fourth of the electorate for the hospital district, they owned one half of the district's tax base.
Moreover, they argued that they would not benefit from the construction of the hospital, noting that
their homes were substantially closer to an existing hospital than the site of the proposed hospital. Id.
The court upheld the formation of the district under state law. Id. at 289. So long as citizens have the
power to form regional special districts, however, state law will give them an incentive to draw
district boundaries so as to maximize the district's property wealth without regard for the underlying
fairness of their decision.
199. See Foster, supra note 24, at 14.
200. Foster noted that most analysts agree that, in contrast to financing services by user fees and
charges, "tax financing promotes communal responsibility for important social services and likely
narrows service disparities." Id. at 107. However, one important study identified three advantages to
the use of user fees over taxes: 1) they prevent waste; 2) they ensure that private benefits will not be
subsidized by the public as a whole; and 3) they allow governments to recoup expenses from
individuals and groups that are not within the government's taxing territory, such as nonresidents
and tax exempt organizations. These benefits can only be attained, however, if the fee is set at the
level that reflects individual, rather than community benefit. See COLMAN, supra note 197, at 9-10.
Moreover, the study recognized that user fees conflict with equity norms when poor citizens are
assessed fees for essential services. Id. at 13.
201. See DUANY ET AL., supra note 5, at 108.
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to the difficulty of calculating the costs and benefits of any large regional
infrastructure, which may in turn lead to unintended overallocation of
costs."' Or it may reflect a pro-suburban bias against central city areas.
Whatever the underlying reason,2 3 recent empirical studies make the
claim that the urban core has subsidized some regionally provided
services.0 4
202. For example, in a lawsuit against a metropolitan area mass transit district, challenging the
allocation of costs as between city riders and suburban commuters, the Second Circuit noted the
many subtle costs and benefits that may have been reflected in the computation of the fares. See
N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1038-40 (2d Cir. 1995).
203. Many other longstanding patterns of revenue distribution reflect similar anti-urban biases.
For instance, with regard to the federal tax treatment of local property tax revenues, Richard
Rothstein's short op-ed piece describes a study by a Stanford economist that shows how the federal
tax treatment of local property taxes produces a huge indirect subsidy for wealthy districts.
Princeton, N.J., for instance, because of its high local property taxes (deductible for federal income
tax purposes), got $2399 in per-student federal aid. Camden, with high direct federal grants through
the Title I program, got only $1140 per student in federal aid). See Richard Rothstein, How the U.S.
Tax Code Worsens the Education Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at B8. Similarly, the federal
commitment to single family housing and its popular mortgage guarantee programs have provided a
tremendous transfer of wealth to suburban Iowa. See DUANY ET AL., supra note 5, at 7-8; JACKSON,
supra note 5, at 190-215, (documenting how these longstanding and extremely expensive federal
programs contributed to urban decay and implemented a strong bias in favor of single family
suburban development). Between 1933 and the late 1960s, almost half of all suburban housing was
financed by federal loans. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 215. Government spending on thousands of
miles of interstate highways constitutes another subsidy of suburbia to which the urban core
contributed. See DUANY ET AL., supra note 5, at 8 (noting that the Interstate Highway Act of 1956
provided for 41,000 miles of roadway, 90% of which was paid for by the federal government, at an
initial cost of $26 billion. The authors also note how common parlance embodies this anti-urban
bent, noting the distinction between the use of the terms "highway investment" and "transit subsidy."
Id. at 96. They quote one study that concludes that government subsidies for highways and parking
total somewhere between 8% and 10% of the GNP, totaling approximately $5,000 per car per year.
Id. at 94; see also JACKSON, supra note 5, at 250 (stating that in post World War II America, 75% of
government transportation expenditures went to building highways, in contrast to 1% dedicated to
urban mass transit). These programs constitute a significant subsidization of suburban amenities by
central city residents. And finally, one author has claimed that cities bear an additional redistributive
burden because of the amount of money they must devote to serving their poor. Though most direct
funding for poverty relief comes from state and federal sources, cities devote more than 12% of their
own source revenues to public welfare, health and hospitals which are utilized by the poor. See
SUMMERS, supra note 73, at 183; see also supra note 93.
204. Commentators have identified several instances in which central city residents subsidize the
provision of suburban infrastructure. One study of the Minneapolis area, for instance, concluded that
the central urban areas paid more than $6 million more in sewer fees than the costs they create;
households in the growing suburban areas received subsidies from those central city users ranging
from between $10 and $136 per household per year. See ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS, supra note 10,
at 71. Another concluded that corporate relocation from city to suburb creates a subsidy by low and
moderate income minority city residents of the suburban redevelopment. See Persky & Wiewel,
supra note 82, at 50-69. See generally Cashin, supra note 5, at 2004-15. City subsidization of
suburbia is not a new phenomenon. One study of school funding in the Atlanta area concluded that
in 1937, more than 50% of the taxes collected for schools in unincorporated areas around Atlanta
came from Atlanta taxpayers. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 132.
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Sixth, more generally, and perhaps most crucially for the New
Regionalism's goal of reducing metropolitan area disparities between
favored quarter and the rest of the region, regional special districts
remove much of the incentive for true regional burden sharing. If the
regional services that are desired and used by the wealthier segments of
the metropolitan area can be obtained without loss of local government
autonomy, without loss of control of local property tax revenues, and
without the imposition of any cost beyond the cost of the service itself,
there is no incentive for regionwide action to achieve metropolitan
equity. By creating regional special districts for the provision of desired
services, the favored quarter governments are able to limit their
participation in regionwide endeavors according to their own perceived
self-interest. They are able to capitalize on the benefits of their presence
in a large metropolitan area, yet they are not required to act as a part of
Similar claims can be made with regard to the funding of regional transportation services. See,
e.g., N.Y. Urban League Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995). In that case,
plaintiffs alleged that city users paid a disproportionate share of the operating costs of the
Metropolitan Transit Authority, an umbrella agency that includes the New York City Transit
Authority and the operating authorities of several commuter transit lines. Although the U.S. Supreme
Court appears to have removed the legal basis of the plaintiffs' Title VI claim, when it held in
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001), that Title VI does not provide a private right
of action, the facts of the NYUL case support the assertion made in the text of this Article, that city
users may in fact subsidize suburban users of regional services. Under state law, the MTA must fully
fund its operating costs; in 1995 it proposed several system-wide fare increases to cover projected
deficits. 71 F.3d at 1035. The fare proposals established a 20% increase in city fares, with a
proposed 8.5% increase in commuter service fares. Consider the following additional facts. City
transit serves 1.5 billion passengers per year; commuter lines have 1.35 million riders. City operating
expenses were $3.1 billion annually, whereas the commuter lines had operating expenses of $1.4
billion. The two services projected different operating deficits: $316 million for the city compared to
$72 million for the commuter lines. The proposed fare increases would generate approximately
$277.3 million; the 20% city fare increase would generate $274 million, whereas the 8.5% commuter
increase would generate $3.3 million. These figures suggest several salient comparisons. City transit
has ten times as many passengers as commuter lines, yet its operating expenses are only 2 /2 times
the size of the commuter lines'. NYUL, 71 F.3d at 1033-35. The proposed fare increase would
generate almost 88% of the city's projected deficit, but less than half of the commuter lines'.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit rejected the claim of discrimination, stating that the proof offered
did "not reveal the extent to which one system might have higher costs associated with its
operations-costs stemming from different maintenance requirements, schedules of operation, labor
contracts, and so on." Id. at 1038. Thus, the cost differential appeared to be tied to either a difference
in quality of service or inefficiencies in the provision of the services; the fact of a higher subsidy of
commuter lines remains unchallenged. For additional discussion of the ways in which city service
users may provide a disproportionately high subsidy of metropolitan area services, see generally
Kevin L. Siegel, Discrimination in the Funding of Mass Transit Systems, 4 HASTINGS W.-N.w. J.
ENVTL. L & POL'Y 107 (1997). Similar conclusions with regard to the development of mass transit
in Philadelphia were discussed in Richard Voith, The Determinants of Metropolitan Development
Patterns: What are the Roles of Preferences, Prices, and Public Choices?, in URBAN-SUBURBAN
INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 5, at 71-82.
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the region when it comes to finding solutions for the pressing
educational, housing, and other social needs that inevitably exist in large
metropolitan areas. Able to pick and choose the areas of regional
governance in which they want to participate, they maintain their
privileged position without having to contribute to the overall regional
welfare. Thus, regional special districts offer an attractive way for the
favored quarter to preserve its privilege and avoid participation in
solutions to regional problems that would require redistribution from
favored quarter to urban core. °5
4. Voluntary Interlocal Burden Sharing
In a recent article, Professor Clayton Gillette explored the New
Regionalist emphasis on achieving metropolitan equity and pointed to
the growing evidence behind the claim that suburban prosperity is
closely linked to central city health.2"6 In light of that clear suburban self-
interest in solving urban problems, Gillette went on to speculate why
examples of formal intermunicipal "burden sharing," which he defines as
"interlocal agreements to alleviate socio-economic disparities within a
region,120 7 are so rare. Dismissing the hypothesis that suburban
indifference to urban ills or antipathy to urban residents could be the
explanation, since, as he had already noted, the suburbs had a selfish
reason to be concerned about the health of the city, Gillette theorized that
the costs of contracting must be the real barrier to interlocal burden
sharing. Specifically, Professor Gillette suggested that legal principles
(such as non-delegation, lending of credit, and public purpose doctrines),
organizational structures (such as fixed geographical municipal
boundaries), and the costs of verifying contract compliance, were the
205. In a recent article, Kathryn Foster attempted to identify characteristics that correlate with
high levels of "effective regional governance." See Foster, supra note 11, at 83-87 (explaining
desired outcomes for regional governance consist of high levels of economic performance, social
equity and regional articulation). Foster then hypothesized that those metropolitan regions with high
levels of effective regionalism would display high concentrations of "regional capital." Id. at 90-96.
The ability to execute intergovernmental agreements, and the presence of many specialized regional
government structures were identified as positive measures of regional capital. See id. Somewhat
surprising to Foster, her analysis did not reveal high correlations between regional capital and
effective regional governance; that is, regions identified as accomplished in regional governance did
not display significantly more indicia of regional capital than the unaccomplished areas. Id. at 113. If
this Article is correct in its suggestion that intergovernmental cooperation and specialized regional
governance mechanisms are anti-regional in impact, the lack of correlation Foster observed may be
due to a mis-identification of the proper measures of regional capital.
206. See Gillette, supra note 18, at 241-47.
207. See id. at 194.
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likely culprits.2"' Rather than revamp the rules to eliminate these
substantial disincentives to redistributional regional efforts, however, he
suggested that informal voluntary agreements may be at least a partial
antidote. 09 Gillette's proposal puts him in direct opposition to local
government scholars who claim that voluntary efforts will never be an
effective means for achieving metropolitan equity and call instead for
directive state or federal action.210
Professor Gillette's suggestion that voluntary intermunicipal burden
sharing could promote regional equity is attractive on several fronts.
Most importantly, and consistent with many of the New Regionalist
goals for metropolitan areas, it preserves existing local autonomy, it is
based on voluntary action rather than coercive direction from a higher
level of government, and it requires the creation of no new governmental
entities in the regions that are already the most saturated with units of
government. For several reasons, however, Gillette's proposal seems
unlikely to have a substantial impact on the regional problems he
identifies.
First, consider Gillette's suggestion that informal agreements may be
preferable to formal intermunicipal burden sharing agreements.2 " That
endorsement is in turn based on the claim that existing legal rules and
government structures create obstacles to formal contracts for
intergovernmental cooperation for regional burden sharing. We are left to
wonder, however, why those same rules and structures have not been an
impediment to the formation of the numerous formal regional
agreements and entities that currently exist in metropolitan areas for
regionwide provision of services. Regional special districts are routinely
created for provision of capital- or infrastructure-intensive services, and
the applicable enabling legislation is frequently broad enough to allow
the use of that structure for regionwide provision of the kind of burden-
sharing Gillette seeks to foster. When intergovernmental benefits the
affluent segment of suburbia, formal legal requirements do not appear to
208. See id. at 212-31.
209. See id. at 263-69. Professor Gillette does not suggest that voluntary arrangements can
completely solve metropolitan area problems, but rather that "in some situations, interlocal bargains
are likely to lead to a better allocation of local resources than we would expect from centralization."
Id. at 196.
210. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 29, at 431-35 (arguing that voluntary cooperation among local
government units is unlikely to remedy metropolitan area disparities in wealth and quality of
services); Briffault, supra note 2, at 1149 ("As long as cooperation is voluntary, no locality will
cooperate with another unless it sees that it will benefit from such cooperation."); Cashin, supra note
5, at 2030-33 (describing proposals for voluntary burden sharing as "fanciful").
211. Gillette, supra note 18, at 263-69.
Vol. 78:93, 2003
Intergovernmental Cooperation
impose insurmountable barriers to regionalism.
Second, Professor Gillette claims that voluntary redistributive efforts
are superior to solutions mandated by higher levels of governments.
Underlying this preference is his assertion that wealthier local
governments should be willing to impose a cost on themselves (by
executing an agreement to burden share with less affluent localities) in
order to receive the vague, indeed indefinite, benefit of enhanced
regional well-being. 2 It is unclear that local governments can be
expected to identify their self-interest over such a long term time line.2" 3
Even if the municipality were to make the long term calculation,
however, the possibility is high that many more immediate demands for
local funds would trump the call for voluntary burden sharing, especially
in this era of tax caps and increased state and federal mandates.214
Third, Professor Gillette's preference for preservation, as opposed to
rearticulation, of the current background rules of local government law
appears inconsistent with the examples he offers in support of voluntary
burden sharing. His article describes several voluntary interlocal burden
sharing agreements to illustrate local government recognition of the
importance of regional well-being and the assumption of responsibility
for achieving it.2" 5 In reality, though, the examples he gives are
predictable reactions based on the immediate, short term self-interest of
the "giving government." That is, voluntary burden sharing appears to
occur when the background legal rules have been modified to give the
"receiving government" the right to extract something from the giving
government that the giving government values more highly than the price
of informal burden sharing. If, for instance, a municipality has the power
to annex land in the surrounding unincorporated county, and if the
county's residents are opposed to annexation, the county's agreement to
212. See id. at 232-40.
213. Policy making in the U.S. appears inextricably tied to short-term, rather than long term,
interests. See Gottlieb, supra note 9, at 38 (noting that "a short-term focus is endemic to American
politics and society"). In fact, one of Gillette's examples of voluntary burden sharing suggests that
municipal governments have considerable difficulty in properly identifying their own long term
interests. In 1982, the city of Charlottesville, in an agreement with Albemarle County, relinquished
its power to annex additional territory in exchange for the county's agreement to share tax revenues
with the city. Twenty years later, Charlottesville is landlocked, and its income has declined by 31%
relative to county income. Its poverty level is now twice as high as the county's, whereas in 1980 the
difference was slight. Recent attempts to have the city revert to town status, thus making it a part of
the county, have failed. See "Does the City of Charlottesville Have a Future as a Town," reprinted at
www.virginia.edu/insideuva/textonlyarchive/93-09-17/l.txt (last visited Jan. 13, 2003); Lucy v.
County of Albemarle, 516 S.E.2d 480, 487 (Va.1999).
214. See COLMAN, supra note 197, at 1, 10-12.
215. Id. at 234-36.
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share revenue with the city in exchange for the city's agreement to
forego annexation is easy to understand. Undoubtedly, it reflects the
county's calculation that it is better to share revenues than to engage in
lengthy, and ultimately futile, battles to resist annexation.1 6 Similarly,
several municipalities within the jurisdiction of a regional district with
regulatory land use powers might be expected to establish a common
fund to offset the negative impacts of the district's decisions. This joint
burden sharing, rather than being motivated by a desire to achieve
regional equity, is better understood as a rational method to allocate the
future costs of unknown future regulation, much the way that joint
municipal insurance pools do.217 Yet another example of voluntary
burden sharing Professor Gillette provides is in fact mandated by state
law.'
18
While Professor Gillette rejects a reworking of the background rules
of local government formation as too costly, the examples he uses to
illustrate implementation of voluntary burden sharing are for the most
part negotiated in jurisdictions that have in fact changed those
background rules. Thus, it appears that voluntary burden sharing
typically occurs only when the state redefines the background legal rules
to create an incentive for burden sharing that generally does not exist. If
the current rules allow the imposition of the costs Gillette seeks to
remediate, and if his examples of voluntary burden sharing occur in
jurisdictions where the usual background rules have been changed, it is
difficult to understand the strength of the case for preservation of the
status quo.
Finally, and more broadly, Professor Gillette's approach to
redistribution of wealth and equalization of services in metropolitan
areas appears to downplay the evidence that the current admitted need
for "burden-sharing" was in no small part created by the efficiency
216. Under the laws of most states, municipalities do not have involuntary annexation powers.
See generally Reynolds, supra note 4. In Virginia, however, annexation can be ordered by a court
irrespective of the wishes of the residents. See VA. CODE ANN § 15.2-3211 (1997). The revenue
sharing agreement between Albemarle County and Charlottesville, then, was a bargain struck against
an unusual set of background legal rules. According to a consultant's report for a multi-county resort
area in Colorado, "Revenue-sharing agreements are most commonly used to resolve or present
annexation disputes." See BBC RESEARCH, LOCAL REVENUE-SHARING METHODOLOGIES 22,
available at http://www.hmccolorado.org/Revenuesharingfinalreport.pdf (2001). In fact, all of the
case studies they presented involved revenue sharing to forestall annexation battles.
217. See Gillette, supra note 18, at 235, for a description of the Meadowlands revenue sharing
program.
218. See id. for a description of the Louisville-Jefferson County revenue sharing compact. Under
state law, some Kentucky cities and their counties are required to share occupational license fees, see
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 79.310-330 (Mitchie1996).
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maximizing. 9  he describes in his discussion of voluntary
intergovernmental cooperation. For central urban areas, into whose lap
many of the costs of these agreements have fallen, the efficiency
maximizing regionalization of services was accompanied by a more
sinister reverse "burden sharing," which transferred wealth from urban
core to peripheral suburb.22° As that imposition of costs continues
unabated, voluntary burden sharing (of both the formal and informal
types) can never be more than a trickle against a flood of efficiency
maximizing.
In sum, though Professor Gillette's underlying premise that voluntary
agreements are preferable to coercive state-mandated redistribution has
some appeal, his proposal highlights one of the intractable problems with
self-contained local governments in a metropolitan region. While he
notes that a purely self-interested, affluent municipality should be willing
to engage in metropolitan redistribution, on the basis that overall regional
health will be enhanced when the less favored quarters of the region
prosper, he attributes the paucity of examples of this self-interested
behavior to legal doctrine and contracting costs.22' Yet his proposal relies
on the preservation of the very legal rules that have already imposed
significant costs on the less favored segments of the metropolitan region.
To reject reformulation of the rules that have benefited the favored
quarter, on the grounds that it would be too costly for that privileged
segment of metropolitan regions, seems to value preservation of privilege
more than reduction of inequality.
B. The New Regionalist Critique of Intergovernmental Cooperation
Commentators have identified ways in which state laws governing
municipal incorporation, annexation, and local taxation facilitate the
preservation of local autonomy and intra-regional inequality. 2 In
219. See Gillette, supra note 18, at 231-32. Gillette does not use the term efficiency maximizing,
but it is an accurate description of the contrast he makes between, on the one hand,
intergovernmental burden sharing agreements, and, on the other hand, those that involve "regional
allocation functions," id. at 231, and are characterized as "agreements for coordination." Id. at 232.
220. See supra notes 93 and 203-04 and accompanying text.
221. See Gillette, supra note 18, at 212-31.
222. See, e.g., WEIHER, supra note 40, at 176-88. Weiher's study concluded that local
government formation in the United States is "peculiarly 'anti-government."' Id. at 165. He
explained:
Incorporation is an act of anti-government in the sense that it permits residents to escape the
collective political demands of larger, more inclusive governmental units. Government becomes
not the agency for brokering the legitimate interests of a diverse society, but an instrument for
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addition, they have noted the prevalence of intergovernmental
cooperation in metropolitan regions and have described the ways in
which these collaborative efforts focus on the provision of services,
rather than on the elimination of inequalities.223 Most have not, however,
examined whether the existing pattern of regionalization, in which
efficiencies are purportedly achieved without loss of governmental
autonomy, may ultimately have a negative impact on overall regional
welfare. 224 To the extent that the New Regionalist critique has been
applied to intergovernmental cooperation, it has praised this "governance
over government" 25 solution as a way for local governments to provide
services they are unable to produce, 26 and as a voluntary collaborative
approach to metropolitan area problems. 7
protecting parochial interests against the brokering process. It becomes a means of escaping the
social contract.
Id. at 182.
Weiher includes several examples, including incorporations done by private corporations to avoid
taxation and regulation, as well as incorporations by wealthy citizens to escape from financing
services for low income individuals, id. at 184. See also Miller, supra note 39, at 34-62; DOWNS,
supra note I at 19-22; JACKSON, supra note 5, at 139; Briffault, supra note 26, at 72-81; Cashin,
supra note 5, at 1992.
223. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 5, at 2030-33; Briffault, supra note 29, at 374-82; RUSK, supra
note 2, at 122-23.
224. In contrast to most current thinking about regionalism, Professor Frug's recent study of
European Union structures and their potential relevance for American metropolitan regions reaches
the same conclusion as the one posited here-that the current array of voluntary intergovernmental
cooperative agreements "are not stepping stones toward comprehensive regional solutions but
successful methods of avoiding them." See Frug, supra note 15, at 1787.
225. See Savitch & Vogel, supra note 9, at 161.
226. Local governments may separate their deliberations over local public services into two
discrete components-first, the decision whether to provide a particular service; second, the decision
as to which government entity should produce that service. The flexibility afforded to most general
purpose local governments under current state laws allow them to enter a wide range of voluntary
agreements whereby another entity actually produces the service to be provided by the receiving
entity in the contract. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1144-45, in which he quotes two urban
economists who distinguish the production and provision aspects of local service delivery. Whereas
the provision decision results from "collective public choice processes to determine how much of
each service to provide and how to pay for it .... the production of public services refers to 'the
technical processes of combining resources to... render a service."') Id. at 1145 n.148, (quoting
Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Metropolitan Organization and Governance: A Local Public
Economy Approach, 25 URn. AFF. Q. 18, 20, 21 (1989)). The public choice analysis makes the
normative claim that local governments' primary purpose is to determine the appropriate range and
quality of local services; under this view, the production source of the services is irrelevant. See
Briffault supra note 2, at 1145.
227. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 5, at 1989; ACIR, supra note 20, at 98 (suggesting that
intergovernmental cooperation appeals to local governments because it allows for better service
provision without structural governmental reorganization). Professor Kathryn Foster views the
ability to execute interlocal service agreements as a factor that correlates positively with heightened
Intergovernmental Cooperation
Voluntary intergovernmental efforts may in fact provide a benefit to
all segments of a metropolitan area. Presumably, for instance, central
cities and suburbs alike are better off with a regional transportation
system than without one. On the surface, then, intergovernmental
cooperation may appear to establish a win-win opportunity for enhancing
regional welfare. Its appeal is multi-faceted: it is based on cooperation
rather than coercion; it preserves the pre-existing local government
entities; and it enhances the overall regional welfare by providing better
or more efficient services to the constituents of various governments in
the region.2"' Missing from the analysis, however, is careful
consideration whether the intergovernmental cooperation approach to
metropolitan issues has in fact facilitated the preservation of widespread
regional disparities.
To answer that question, the inquiry must go beyond the limited focus
on whether the central urban core is better off with a particular regional
service than without one. More relevant to the New Regionalist analysis
is the question whether the central city, and ultimately the entire region,
is as well off with the current regime of voluntary cooperation as it
would have been if metropolitan area governments had adopted, not only
regional transportation and sewerage systems, but also regional policies
for things such as housing, job creation, tax revenue distribution, and
schools. So long as the favored quarter is not required to participate more
broadly in regionwide governance, no empirical evidence will be
available to answer that question. And because of the rules of
intergovernmental cooperation, the central city is in a "take it or leave it"
situation. Like the favored quarter, the city can choose to participate in
regional governance when it would advance its own interest, but, unlike
the affluent quarter, the regional governance efforts it most needs are
responses to problems that are more heavily concentrated in non-favored
quarter segments of the metropolitan area. As a result, because the New
Regionalism's primary goal is to correct the socio-economic disparities
regional economic performance, decreased social inequity, and articulation of a regional
consciousness. In a recent article, she asserted that the ability to enter interlocal contracts for
services constitutes an important component of the "legal capital" that contributes to effective
regional governance. The other three variables she identified include municipal powers of
involuntary annexation, state authorization of city-county consolidation, and limited home rule
powers. See Foster, supra note 11, at 93.
228. State courts have commented favorably on the legislative goal of intergovemmental
cooperation statutes. See, e.g., United Water Resources Inc. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm.,
685 A.2d 24, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) ("Their aim is the avoidance of duplication, and
the fostering of regionalization with concomitant economies and efficiencies of scale."); Teamsters
Union Local 117 v. Port of Seattle, No. 36366-2-1, 1996 WL 523973, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting legislative endorsement of cooperation between municipalities).
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in metropolitan regions, the voluntary intergovernmental cooperation
approach to regionalism is likely to leave untouched the root sources of
the very disparity it seeks to remedy. The end result is a selective
regionalism, for which the metropolitan area is "all in it together" when
regional action benefits the favored quarter, but for which the "it's your
problem" response can be given to central city proposals to correct
inadequacies in city infrastructure or services.
IV. CONCLUSION: MOVING TOWARDS REGIONAL EQUITY
A. Recognizing the Anti-Regional Impacts of Intergovernmental
Cooperation
Intergovernmental cooperative endeavors are flourishing in
metropolitan areas. Most recently, this trend has received the
endorsement of commentators who predict that continued focus on
voluntary regionalization efforts, when seen through the self-interested
lens of the favored quarter suburbs, will lead to increased metropolitan
equity.229 Yet at the same time, the gap between central city and suburbia
has widened. Though the correlation does not necessarily establish a
causal connection, this Article has suggested that the two phenomena are
related, and that more than mere coincidence is involved. By identifying
several ways in which intergovernmental cooperation may both preserve
and exacerbate intra-regional inequality, this Article hopes to encourage
reexamination of the New Regionalist agenda, at least in so far as it
praises intergovernmental cooperation as a realistic tool for narrowing
the urban-suburban gap. At a minimum, the analysis offered here should
temper the enthusiasm with which the New Regionalist embraces
intergovernmental cooperation.
Because of the wide variation in terms of the participants, the
services, and the relationships among and between the governmental
entities involved, general pronouncements about the anti-regional impact
of intergovernmental cooperation would be overstated and unhelpful.
Some of the examples discussed in this Article, in fact, suggest that
metropolitan equity at times could be enhanced by some voluntary
cooperative efforts.230  At the same time, though, an uncritical
229. See supra notes 76-80 and 206-211 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 189 (discussing Barnes v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 341 N.W.2d 766
(Iowa 1984), in which the court invalidated actions taken by a voluntarily created regional housing
authority). This Article's discussion of joint services agreements has also suggested ways in which
some of those agreements could have positive impacts on regional welfare. See Part III.A.2.
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endorsement of widespread intergovernmental cooperation appears
misguided. The possible anti-regional impacts are at least three-fold.
First, to the extent that intergovernmental cooperative efforts result in the
establishment of a separate governmental entity, they remove difficult
funding decisions from the general purpose government and ultimately
skew the revenue allocation in favor of those regional services, at the
expense of what remains to be funded out of the local government's
general revenues, most notably spending for social services.23' In
addition, intergovernmental cooperation may extract a benefit for
wealthier suburban areas while it imposes costs on the central urban
areas.23  And finally, the "pick and choose" phenomenon of
intergovernmental cooperation leaves affluent, autonomous local
governments in a privileged position to select those aspects of
metropolitan policy for which their cooperation is a desirable and
interest-maximizing possibility, freeing them from participation in
regional policies that would redistribute revenues to the rest of the
metropolitan area. The combined impact of these phenomena tips the
balance against the urban core, which is left without recourse to state or
local laws to correct the imbalance.
B. Refining the New Regionalist Agenda
Though the "New Regionalism" has yet to result in a cohesive
doctrinal approach to metropolitan area problems, it appears to have been
the catalyst for a growing coalescence around the urgent need for
government action to correct metropolitan area inequities. Having come
to that position from a variety of ideological and analytical perspectives,
commentators and policy makers must now evaluate whether current
urban strategies are in fact consistent with their goal. Recognizing the
perhaps unintended anti-regional costs of voluntary intergovernmental
efforts, both past and ongoing, is itself an important step; articulating
alternatives to solve the problem, however, is infinitely more
challenging.
Surely, it is too late to envision a metropolitan area without regional
special districts and other intergovernmental cooperative endeavors. Not
231. This phenomenon of "full line forcing" is discussed supra at note 197. If a service is
provided at a regional level by a single purpose government, the absence of full line forcing will
result in a disproportionate amount of money for regional services (usually infrastructure intensive
services such as waste treatment or transportation), at the expense of what remains to be funded out
of the government's general revenues, most notably spending for social services.
232. This claim appears to find clearest support in several studies of funding for regional
transportation systems and highway spending. See supra note 204.
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only are they entrenched in the metropolitan landscape, they also
undoubtedly confer many benefits on all segments of metropolitan areas.
The favored quarter, however, has received disproportionate benefits
from widespread intergovernmental cooperation. Not only has it been
subsidized by the rest of the region in the provision of some essential
services, it has also solidified its privilege with its ability to choose to
participate in regional governance only when it would be to its own
advantage. That double advantage requires offsetting recompense and
action to counter the misallocation of resources in metropolitan regions.
Leaving the elimination of the enormous, and ever-growing, urban-
suburban gap in the hands of autonomous local governments implausibly
hopes that those who have benefited from the current trends will decide
to reverse them.
Central to the New Regionalist analysis is the elimination of the
socio-economic disparities that plague all major metropolitan areas.
Many scholars and politicians have noted the increasing schism and have
presented proposals for change. And not surprisingly, current
regionalism proposals vary widely in terms of the structures they
propose, the implementation mechanisms they suggest, and the extent of
state and local law revision they require. It is not for lack of analysis and
proposals to reconfigure metropolitan areas that intra-regional inequality
has intensified and that metropolitan regions show increasing levels of
fragmentation and overlap of governmental units. Moving beyond
voluntary intergovernmental efforts, however, leads to the inevitable
conclusion that true regionalism efforts will impose financial and
political costs on the favored quarter's local government units. As a
result, the political barriers are substantial. In the final analysis, however,
it is the responsibility of the state governments that have facilitated the
problem to solve it.233
Though the similarities of metropolitan area demographics are
substantial, it would be a mistake to suggest that the New Regionalism
can develop a standard issue, one size fits all solution to metropolitan
area disparities. Restoration of the suburban-urban balance can be
233. Federal policies and incentives have also played a role in shaping the current anti-regional
landscape in metropolitan areas, but they are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., FOSTER,
supra note 24, at Ill (noting how federal funding and federal tax laws have often encouraged the
proliferation of regional special districts); Mark Alan Hughes, Federal Roadblocks to Regional
Cooperation: The Administrative Geography of Federal Programs in Larger Metropolitan Areas, in
URBAN-SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra 5 at 161 (explaining that housing authorities, county
welfare agencies, job training programs all based on the artificial territorial jurisdiction of city and
county, in large part because of federal policies); Savitch & Vogel, supra note 9, at 164 (noting that




pursued through many mechanisms, ranging from complete
governmental reorganization at the regional level, to the establishment of
more limited regional units with control over regional problems such as
schools and affordable housing, to more modest redistributive measures,
such as tax sharing or restructuring of the regional tax base itself. 234 And,
as the few successful efforts to consolidate municipal and county
governments in metropolitan areas can teach us, the legal and political
context is extremely important. Existing state statutes, the local political
climate, the history of the relationships among existing units of local
governments, the strengths and interests of minority groups, and the
influence of major political parties, are all extremely important
determinants of the shape any regional action will take.235 The suitability
of a proposed regional reform in any particular situation will depend on
the interplay of these and many other factors. Notwithstanding the wide
range of options, however, the failures of voluntary intergovernmental
efforts suggests that the one common necessary ingredient is state
commitment to the goal of eliminating the suburban gap. Metropolitan
area redistribution makes sense, not only because it may be in the
favored quarter's own long-term self-interest 236 or because it may now be
politically feasible through the forging of metropolitan area alliances
among the "unfavored" quarters in the metropolitan area, 7 but also
because it is "the right thing to do." '238
234. States might consider, for instance, something like a metropolitan area benefits tax, to be
levied on favored quarter participants in all voluntary intergovernmental efforts. This tax would
impose distinct and immediate costs on intergovernmental cooperation. It would recognize that
although intergovernmental cooperation may produce tangible benefits for some segments of a
metropolitan region, it is also likely to impose costs on other areas. It would also work against the
"pick and choose" phenomenon of intergovernmental cooperation, by conditioning favored quarter
ability to extract a benefit from its presence in a metropolitan area on its willingness to contribute to
narrowing the gap with the other segments of the metropolitan area, without which the
intergovernmental cooperation would be impossible. It is of course unlikely that this tax would alone
close the gap between favored quarter and the rest of the region. Some supra-regional redistribution
is likely to be essential to the realization of metropolitan area equity. See Anita A. Summers, supra
note 73, at 190-92; RUSK, supra note 2, at 107. A metropolitan area benefits tax, however, would
correctly tax the wealth produced for the favored quarter by intergovernmental cooperative
agreements.
235. See VALENTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 448-60 for fuller discussion of the consolidation
phenomenon and the factors that shape it.
236. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 18; see also supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text the
discussion of the so-called "interdependence imperative."
237. See generally ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS, supra note 10; Cashin, supra note 5. This
justification for regionalism depends on the ability of central city and surrounding, declining inner
ring suburbs to create a new political majority.
238. See supra note 94.
Washington Law Review Vol. 78:93, 2003
As this Article joins the chorus in support of the New Regionalists'
call for fairer allocation of resources and opportunities in metropolitan
America, it has suggested that intergovernmental cooperation, at least as
currently structured, is not a viable tool for the realization of that goal.
True regional equity requires a reformulation of the legal rules and
structures that preserve and possibly exacerbate the widening disparity
between urban core and other metropolitan area constituents. With the
anti-regional effects of intergovernmental cooperation identified, one
intuitively appealing and popular solution has been taken off the
regionalists' table. What remains are proposals that are all likely to
produce strong resistance from favored quarter governments. If this
Article is correct in its claim that intergovernmental cooperative efforts
are facilitating the preservation of the urban-suburban gap, however, it is
time to reexamine those alternative, though undoubtedly more
controversial, proposals in the elusive search for regional equity.
